James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
Such an amazing feeling of being disconnected!
Wonderful!!!!!
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
416 225 2777
The decision in Desbiens v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp., 2009 SCC 55 and the companion decision in Plourde v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp., 2009 SCC 54 was released today.
The workers of the Wal-Mart store at Jonquière chose to bargain collectively through their union, which had been certified by the Commission des relations du travail ("CRT") in August 2004. After unsuccessful negotiations, the Minister of Labour appointed an arbitrator to resolve the outstanding differences. On the same day, Wal-Mart announced closure of the store. Three employees filed a complaint under s. 16 of the Quebec Labour Code claiming that they lost their employment because of the unionization of the store. They sought an order under s. 15 of the Code that they be reinstated in their jobs. The CRT was not satisfied that the store closure was definitive and allowed the employees' complaint, holding that Wal-Mart had failed to discharge its onus under s. 17 of the Code that the dismissals were for good and sufficient reason. It reserved its jurisdiction to determine the appropriate remedies. The Superior Court dismissed Wal-Mart's application for judicial review, but the Court of Appeal overturned that decision.
The Supreme Court, with strong dissents, dismissed the appeal.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, Deschamps, Fish, Charron and Rothstein JJ.: The Court of Appeal erred in quashing the CRT decision. On the evidence, the finding that Wal-Mart had failed to rebut the s. 17 presumption was a determination well within the range of reasonable outcomes open to the CRT. However, in the companion case Plourde v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp., which dealt with the same factual issue, the CRT heard additional evidence which persuaded it that Wal-Mart had in fact terminated the lease of the building at the Jonquière location and concluded that Wal-Mart had successfully rebutted the s. 17 presumption by proof of a real and definitive business closure. None of the parties now contends that Wal-Mart retains its option to re-open the Jonquière store. As a practical matter it would be a waste of the parties' time and money to remit this case to the CRT to be dealt with on the basis of the Plourde decision. The outcome would not be in doubt. The Jonquière store is closed and there is no possibility of reinstatement of the employees. The substratum of their s. 15 claim no longer exist.
Per LeBel, Abella and Cromwell JJ. (dissenting): The employees' complaints should be returned to the CRT to be heard on the merits. As stated in Plourde v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp., a dismissal can be scrutinized for anti-union animus under ss. 15 to 19 of the Labour Code. The dismissals in this case ought therefore to be re-evaluated to determine whether there was an anti-union motivation.
416 225 2777

It is rare for Constitutional law division of powers cases to get to the Supreme Court f
A summary of the decision follows:
Fastfrate is a freight forwarding company with branches across
The union representing the Fastrate Calgary employees applied to the Alberta Labour Relations Board for a declaration on whether the labour relations of Fastfrate Calgary are subject to provincial or federal regulation. This application was in response to an earlier application by another union to be certified by the Canadian Industrial Relations Board as the regional bargaining unit of Fastfrate employees for
Per LeBel, Deschamps, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.: The employees of Fastfrate Calgary are subject to provincial jurisdiction. The question whether an undertaking, service or business is a federal one depends on the nature of its operations. An undertaking that performs consolidation and deconsolidation and local pickup and delivery services does not become an interprovincial undertaking simply because it has an integrated national corporate structure and contracts with third party interprovincial carriers. Fastfrate's operations are entirely intraprovincial. Neither Fastfrate employees, nor its equipment, are involved in any actual interprovincial transport. Section 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the jurisprudence interpreting it do not contemplate that a mere contractual relationship between a shipper and an interprovincial carrier would qualify Fastfrate as an undertaking connecting the provinces or extending beyond the limits of the province. Rather, it is the carriers that physically transport the freight interprovincially that constitute federal transportation works and undertakings. There is no indication that contracting alone can make intraprovincial undertakings subject to federal jurisdiction. The operational reality of Fastfrate is that it depends on third‑party interprovincial carriers to conduct its business. Fastfrate remains a shipper. Its presence at both the originating and terminating ends may mean that it can provide a comprehensive service to its customers, but this does not change the fact that it is still only a shipper using an interprovincial railway or trucking company.
The s. 92(13) provincial head of power over "Property and Civil rights" in the provinces includes labour relations. By way of exception, Parliament may assert exclusive jurisdiction over these matters if it is shown that such jurisdiction is an integral part of its primary competence over some other single federal subject. Section 92(10)(a) provides for such an exception to the provincial jurisdiction over "Local Works and Undertakings" by granting to the federal government authority over "Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and other Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the Province". However, having regard to the historical context of s. 92(10) and its underlying purpose, the preference for diversity of regulatory authority over works and undertakings should be respected, absent a justifiable reason that exceptional federal jurisdiction should apply.
In this case, there was no compelling reason to depart from the general rule that works and undertakings are regulated by the provinces. Section 92(10)(a) focusses specifically on transportation and communication works and undertakings through its examples of "Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs". The common thread among the enumerated transportation works and undertakings in s. 92(10)(a) is the interprovincial transport of goods or persons. The enumerated examples are all instruments of or means of facilitating actual transport. There is no reference to, or implication of, third parties connected to the means of actual transport through contract being subject to federal jurisdiction. The genus of transportation works and undertakings contemplated in s. 92(10)(a) as "connecting the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the Province" are those that physically connect the provinces through transport, not those that notionally connect them through contract. The basket clause "other works and undertakings" is to be read ejusdem generis with the specific examples which precede it. A requirement for federal jurisdiction over transportation undertakings is that the undertaking itself physically operates or facilitates carriage across interprovincial boundaries. The line of cases holding that freight forwarders that are not themselves engaged in the interprovincial transport of freight and that simply contract with interprovincial carriers remain subject to provincial jurisdiction should be upheld.
Finally, under s. 92(10)(a), there is a difference between the communications and transportation contexts. Communications undertakings can operate and provide international and interprovincial communication services from a fixed point whereas transportation, by definition, involves mobility of goods, persons, and transportation equipment across territory. In the transportation context, it is not possible for an undertaking to operate an interprovincial transportation service where it does not itself perform the interprovincial carriage. A business can act as an intermediary between interprovincial carriers and consumers who want to access those carriers at a reduced price. This does not mean that such a business becomes the operator and provider of the interprovincial carriage. The objective of predictability in the freight‑forwarding context strongly suggests that the industry should be considered holistically and the prior jurisprudence of the courts concerning the industry respected.
Today's decision in R. v. J.M.H., 2009 ONCA 834 is a good source for the basic law regarding how evidence is to be treated for appeal purposes in criminal matters:
[33] It is well-settled that the admissibility of evidence is a question of law: R. v. B. (G.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 57, at p. 71. What appears less clear is the extent to which the assessment of properly admissible evidence in a particular case also raises a question of law alone, thus is cognizable on appeals from acquittal under s. 676(1)(a).
[34] A misapprehension of evidence may involve a failure to consider evidence relevant to a material issue, a mistake about the substance of the evidence, or a failure to assign proper effect to the evidence: R. v. Morrissey (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.), at p. 538. To determine in any given case whether a particular misapprehension of evidence amounts to an error of law alone is a question that is not entirely unencumbered with difficulty: Morrissey at p. 538.
[35] The Crown is not entitled to contest an acquittal on the ground that the acquittal is unreasonable or not supported by the evidence. Sections 686(1)(a)(i) and (ii) clearly distinguish between unreasonable and unsupportable verdicts, on the one hand, and wrong decisions on questions of law, on the other. Implicit in the dispositive authority enacted by s. 686(1)(a) is the correlative right of a person convicted of an indictable offence to challenge the conviction on the ground of unreasonableness. No such authority is furnished to the Crown or court on appeals from acquittal: Sunbeam Corp. (
[36] A trial judge must take a legally correct approach to the evidence in a case, lest the final step in the process of adjudication, weighing the evidence, be flawed: B. (G.) at p. 77. As a necessary corollary to the proposition just stated, an erroneous approach to or treatment of the evidence adduced at trial constitutes legal error: B. (G.) at p. 71; see also Wild v. The Queen, [1971] S.C.R. 101, at pp. 111-112. It is equally wrong to ground a reasonable doubt on pure conjecture: see Wild at p. 117. Misapprehension or lack of appreciation of relevant evidence only amounts to legal error where there is a self-misdirection by the trial judge on the applicable legal principles: B. (G.) at p. 75. On appeals from acquittal, it is more difficult to establish with certainty that the error raises a question of law alone because of the Crown's burden of proof and the enhanced importance of examining critically all evidence that may raise a reasonable doubt: B. (G.) at p. 75.
[37] A trial judge's failure to direct her or himself to all the evidence relevant to a material issue may amount to legal error: B. (G.) at p. 72. It is also legally wrong for a trial judge to fail to consider individual items of evidence in the context of the evidence as a whole; in other words, it is wrong to use a piecemeal approach, extracting individual items from their evidentiary surroundings: see B. (G.) at p. 77. It is all the more so where the individual items are subjected to the standard of proof required of the evidence as a whole: see R. v. Morin, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345, at p. 359.
[38] As a general rule, findings of fact made in the absence of any supportive evidence are errors of law: R. v. Schuldt, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 592, at p. 604. Where the finding of fact made in the absence of evidence is an acquittal, however, an error of law occurs only where there has been a transfer to the accused by law of the burden of proving a particular fact: Schuldt at p. 604.
So?
Since when has it been that difficult to get close to any politician other than the uberBoss -- here Obama? Sure there was a security breach but politicians are (in a democracy) there to serve the people so it's hardly a surprise that 'the people' get to see them!
(Besides, I am jealous -- Joe Biden never took a photo with me!!!)
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
The Court found that the accused had been stopped while driving because he was a young black man, that he was then subject to an illegal search (which uncovered drugs) and that highway traffic charges to justify the illegal search were trumped up. The Court excluded the evidence.
The decision is not available online but I can send a scan to whoever asks.
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
Today's decision in Schneider v. St. Clair Region Conservation Authority, 2009 ONCA 830 gives a good illustration of where the Court will reduce costs because the issues under consideration are (reasonably) novel and the costs sought are out of proportion to the matters in dispute. The Court writes:
[4] With respect to the Region's trial costs, the region seeks costs in the amount of $50,000 inclusive of GST and disbursements. As compared to the Township's costs and given the length of the trial, the amount sought does not appear to be excessive. In the context of this case, however, we nonetheless, consider that a reduced amount is more appropriate and would award $18,000 inclusive of GST and disbursements. We do so for the following reasons.
[5] First, the issues raised with respect to the Region's liability involved an interpretation of s. 4(1) of the Occupier's Liability Act, not previously decided by our court. The decision clarified the law respecting occupier's liability in a significant respect.
[6] Second, the total amount of costs the respondents are being asked to pay is significant and would be disproportionate to the amount in issue. The Township's costs have already been agreed to by the parties and cannot now be changed. In light of the amounts claimed and the issues involved, it would not be fair and reasonable to require the respondents to pay the full amount being claimed by the Region.
Conservative MP Gerald Keddy is apologizing for referring to some unemployed Haligonians as "no-good bastards."
Keddy, MP for the Nova Scotia riding of South Shore-St. Margaret's, issued a statement Tuesday saying he was sorry for the "insensitive comments."
"In no way did I mean to offend those who have lost their job due to the global recession, nor did I mean to suggest that anyone who is unemployed is not actively looking for employment," he said.
Keddy's office declined to comment further.
In an interview with a local newspaper, Keddy suggested that farmers in the province need migrant labourers because unemployed Nova Scotians don't want the work.
"All those no-good bastards sitting on the sidewalk in Halifax that can't get work," Tuesday's Chronicle Herald quotes Keddy as saying.
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
Second court ruling against Ont. stunt driving law won't derail province
November, 23, 2009 - 07:30 pm Maurino, Romina - (THE CANADIAN PRESS)
TORONTO - A second ruling against Ontario's stunt driving law is unlikely to put the brakes on the legislation, although minor tweaking may be needed to ensure it stays in place after it was once again ruled unconstitutional.
Attorney General Chris Bentley defended the law Monday after a Newmarket judge dismissed stunt driving charges against Alexandra Drutz, an 18-year-old woman charged with going 157 kilometres per hour on Highway 407 north of Toronto.
Justice Peter West ruled that having a potential penalty of up to six months in jail for people caught driving 50 kilometres an hour over the posted speed limit violates the Charter of Rights because the law does not allow the accused to present a defence.
But Bentley said the law is an important public safety initiative and will continue to be enforced.
"The law was brought in to save lives," said Bentley.
"It is extremely important that we have safe roads, not only for those who are driving but all of the people who are users of the road."
Bentley said he still considers the 2007 law constitutional, and will fight to uphold it when the Court of Appeal hears an initial case in January.
Toronto criminal lawyer James Morton called West's decision "a real blow to the legislation," and said it will have some influence on the January appeal.
"It's leading to there being a weight of decisions in favour of finding it unconstitutional," said Morton.
"It's going to be difficult to have both of these decisions overturned."
The problem could be fixed with a little tweaking, however, because both rulings took issue with the same provision.
"To fix it all they have to do is remove the availability of a prison term," said Morton.
"And because the prison term is imposed by regulation, they could make the change next Wednesday in cabinet."
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
If anything the decision is more careful than Raham. It will be hard to overturn on appeal.
Drutz is not available online but I have a scan I can email to whoever asks.
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777

His book BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM is as good as any. His book stands as a sober reminder that we have not grown beyond our history.
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777