Saturday, June 16, 2012
Chief Justice Rebecca White Berch
Friday, June 15, 2012
Government by judges
But they are not legislators and are not the voice of the people. They have little or no training in sociology, philosophy or politics. Their task is to interpret and apply laws -- not to write laws.
And yet, despite 120 years of legislative consideration, a judge today held the legal ban on assisted suicide was improper. The judge decided that she, rather than members of Parliament elected by Canadians across the country, was better able to reform the law. Her view, standing alone, trumped that of Parliament.
Maybe legalizing assisted suicide is the right decision -- in fact, I am inclined towards it -- and if I am ever an MP I'd be interested in legislative reform. But legislative reform is a decision for Parliament, the elected representatives of the nation, and not a lawyer appointed to the bench for life.
A judge commissions no studies, hears no witnesses, save as called by the parties, and has no input from ordinary Canadians. A judge doesn't face voters every election and doesn't have to justify her decisions to the public. All that makes sense when applying the law as between two parties. But it makes no sense to have such an individual, without anything more, making new laws. Even kings have their advisers -- judges have none.
Parliament has repeatedly considered, and rejected, proposed changes to the law regarding assisted suicide. In recent years, Parliament has dealt with nine private member bills on the issue – three failed to gain any support, and six were debated in the House and voted down.
The issue does not pose an obvious infringement of a protected right or freedom. Only by stretching the meaning of equality and life or security of the person could the judge finesse a Charter breach (indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada found no breach only twenty years ago). Parliament has given the issue consideration. This is not a proper decision for the Court to make. The Court over reached.
B.C. Supreme Court strikes down ban on doctor-assisted suicide
VANCOUVER—The B.C. Supreme Court has ruled that a terminally ill woman is allowed to have a doctor-assisted suicide.
Story here
The stunning decision Friday gives Gloria Taylor, a 64-year-old woman with late-stage ALS, a constitutional exemption to proceed with physician-assisted suicide.
It’s a ruling that has long been sought by right-to-die organizations in Canada and long fought against by anti-euthanasia groups.
B.C. Supreme Court Justice Lynn Smith ruled she was giving Taylor an “exceptional remedy of a constitutional exemption” while Parliament decides whether and how to respond to the declarations of constitutional invalidity.
Smith placed a 12-month extension on her ruling, which means that while she has ruled the current law invalid, Parliament has one year to change the law.
In her 395-page ruling, Smith found that Taylor’s Charter rights were violated under the 20-year law, which made it a criminal offence for anyone to arrange and receive assistance in their own death.
Smith found that the current legislation infringes Taylor’s equality rights because the law does not prohibit suicide. Smith added that people who are so physically disabled that they cannot commit suicide without help are denied that option because s.241 in the Criminal Code prohibits assisted suicide.
“The provisions regarding assisted suicide have a more burdensome effect on persons with physical disabilities than on able-bodied persons, and thereby create, in effect, a distinction based on physical disability,” she ruled.
Taylor, a divorced mother with two grown sons and an 11-year-old granddaughter, was one of five plaintiffs in the suit seeking to overturn the current legislation. Of the plaintiffs, she has become the most visible because her condition is the most dire.
Taylor will be allowed to have a physician-assisted suicide if she meets a number of conditions that include an assessment from a psychiatrist and confirmation from her physician that the woman has been fully informed about her prognosis and the ability of drugs and palliative care to alleviate her suffering.
Taylor was diagnosed with ALS in 2009, a degenerative disease also known popularly as Lou Gehrig’s Disease. In January 2010, she was told she would likely be paralyzed in six months and die within the year. She has fared better than predicted and her condition plateaued over the last year. But recently in the last few weeks, her condition has again deteriorated and she now largely uses a wheelchair and requires a feeding tube.
Taylor’s case bears similarities to the landmark case of Sue Rodriguez, a Victoria woman who also had ALS and sought a physician-assisted suicide. Rodriguez’ case, which went all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada, led to the 1993 5-4 decision that ruled assisted suicide a criminal offence.
Remember Tommy Douglas was an Ordained Minister
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| A 'criminal's' mug shot -- King was more than just words |
People of faith perform corporal works of mercy. Remember that next time someone suggests otherwise -- people of faith can be liberals and care about liberal values:
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2012/06/15/father-raymond-j-de-souza-martin-luther-kings-lessons-for-the-age-of-obama/#more-81883
"Preaching on Matthew 25, Martin Luther King spoke in blunt language about those who claim to be Christians but do not feed the poor, or clothe the naked, or visit the sick.
“The Lord will say to them: ‘Get out of my face!’ ” preached King. Remember that next time someone tries to make King into a milquetoast clergyperson urging everyone just to get along."
Reasonableness review
[44] Reasonableness review is concerned both with the transparency and intelligibility of the reasons given for a decision and with the outcome of the decision-making process: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47; Montreal Port Authority, at para. 38. As Abella J. has recently explained in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, "the reasons must be read together with the outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a range of possible outcomes": para. 14.
Principled approach to hearsay and reliability
Three dead after shooting at the University of Alberta
http://www.edmontonjournal.com/touch/story.html?id=6786020
Three employees of an armoured vehicle company were shot and killed at the University of Alberta early Friday morning, Edmonton police confirm.
A fourth victim is in hospital with critical injuries, said Staff Sgt. Erik Johnson with Edmonton police southwest division.
Police were called to reports of gunshots at the University of Alberta's Hub Mall shortly after midnight
Thursday, June 14, 2012
Statement By Premier McGuinty On The 2012 Budget
Today Premier Dalton McGuinty released the following statement:
"For months, Ontario's MPPs have had before them a budget that will keep our economy on track. And keep our deficit going down.
The government, throughout these months, has made real efforts to be fair and reasonable.
The budget includes ideas proposed by both the PCs and the NDP. It is a plan that will ensure that our province keeps moving forward. But after being fair and reasonable, it is time to be firm.
Earlier today, the NDP turned their backs — yet again — on an agreement to pass our budget.
They joined forces with the PCs to gut the government's budget bill.
The consequences of the NDP's latest backtrack would hurt our economy when what it needs most is stability and certainty. Andrea Horwath and her party have, for the second time, broken their word about passing this budget.
This is about Ontario's economic livelihood and our ability to continue steering the province in the right direction in these challenging times.
It's absolutely imperative that we pass this budget. And if we cannot pass this budget, we will take it to the people in a general election.
If Tim Hudak and his caucus want to support the budget, we'd welcome their support to avoid an election Ontarians don't want.
If any member of either opposition party wants to put the provincial interest ahead of their party's own interest, we'd be happy to work with them.
Otherwise, Andrea Horwath breaking her word a second time at this late stage has left us with absolutely no choice — we will be forced to take this to the people."
BlackBerry maker Research in Motion is giving Jim Balsillie and Mike Lazaridis a $12 million golden parachute
I know I know, we must never complain about the way capitalism distributes wealth because the market is always right...
A company filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Thursday revealed Balsillie and Lazaridis will be getting $7.93-million and $3.96-million respectively after resigning as co-CEOs and co-chairs of the Waterloo-based firm.
Story here
Musings on the Dr. Dawg case
“Nonetheless, although the respondents come close to asserting – but do not quite assert – that “anything goes” in these types of exchanges, is that the case in law? Do different legal considerations apply in determining whether a statement is or is not defamatory in these kinds of situations than apply to the publication of an article in a traditional media outlet? For that matter, do different considerations apply even within publications on the internet – to a publication on Facebook or in the “Twitterverse”, say, compared to a publication on a blog? “
Baglow v. Smith, 2012 ONCA 407, para 28
Context is important. In the Dr. Dawg case a well known left leaning blogger (full disclosure, someone I have dealt with on-line and respect) was called “one of the Taliban’s more vocal supporters” during a flame war.
Without question, if this was a statement made in an opinion piece in, say, the Toronto Star the statement would be actionable. But the Court raises the question, if on the blogosphere there is a “broad range of tolerance for hyperbolic language” perhaps comments like the one in question are not actionable?
The Court declined to decide saying there weren’t enough facts to conclude one way or the other.
Certainly I get insults on-line that don’t trouble me but would make my blood boil if made face-to-face. On the other hand, just because someone is left leaning does not mean they are a Taliban supporter (and I note the Taliban are not, shall we say, progressive).
Stay tuned – the case will continue… .
Dr Dawg wins on appeal
[27] In this case, the parties have put in play a scenario that, to date, has received little judicial consideration: an allegedly defamatory statement made in the course of a robust and free-wheeling exchange of political views in the internet blogging world where, the appellant concedes, arguments "can be at times caustic, strident or even vulgar and insulting." Indeed, some measure of what may seem to be a broad range of tolerance for hyperbolic language in this context may be taken from the apparent willingness of the appellant to absorb the slings and arrows of the "traitor" and "treason" labels without complaint.
[28] Nonetheless, although the respondents come close to asserting – but do not quite assert – that "anything goes" in these types of exchanges, is that the case in law? Do different legal considerations apply in determining whether a statement is or is not defamatory in these kinds of situations than apply to the publication of an article in a traditional media outlet? For that matter, do different considerations apply even within publications on the internet – to a publication on Facebook or in the "Twitterverse", say, compared to a publication on a blog?
[29] These issues have not been addressed in the jurisprudence in any significant way. The responses may have far-reaching implications. They are best crafted on the basis of a full record after a trial – at least until the law evolves and crystallizes to a certain point – in my view. A trial will permit these important conclusions to be formulated on the basis of a record informed by the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and quite possibly with the assistance of expert evidence to provide the court – whose members are perhaps not always the most up-to-date in matters involving the blogosphere – with insight into how the internet blogging world functions and what may or may not be the expectations and sensibilities of those who engage in such discourse in the particular context in which that discourse occurs.
[30] Although made against a slightly different background – whether a statement made using a microphone at a public rally was in law a libel or a slander – the observations of this Court in Romano v. D'Onofrio (2005), 77 O.R. (3d) 583 confirm that novel questions of law or of mixed law and fact in defamation matters ought generally to be determined at a trial. At paras. 7 and 9, the Court, citing R. D. Belanger & Associates Ltd. v. Stadium Corp. of Ontario Ltd. (1991), 5 O.R. (3d) 778, observed that "'matters of law which have not been settled fully in our jurisprudence should not be disposed of at this [interlocutory] stage in the proceedings'" because they involve a "type of interpretative analysis [that] should only be done in the context of a full factual record, possibly including appropriate expert evidence."
[31] These considerations are particularly significant in relation to several of the issues here. First, whether the words "this coming from one of the Taliban's more vocal supporters" are in fact defamatory of the appellant depends upon a careful analysis of the context in which the statement was made, including not just a review of the electronic dialogue between "Dr. Dawg" and "Peter O'Donnell," which the motion judge had before him, but also an assessment of the two individuals and the view they took of the exchange – something that requires at least cross-examination on the positions they initially put forward. The analysis further requires a consideration of the view that a reasonable reader of the exchange may take of the exchange in the context, an issue that might well require some expert testimony for resolution as noted above. For similar reasons, I am not convinced that either the issue of whether the impugned words constitute "comment" or "fact" or the issue of malice in relation to the defence of fair comment can be resolved at this stage. They both require a delicate balancing of the factual context in its entirety for determination.
[32] On the issue of malice alone, I am not persuaded that the fact "Dr. Dawg" and "Peter O'Donnell" did not know each other personally and only communicated via the internet is dispositive. Determining actual and express malice often requires that the trier of fact draw inferences from proved facts. Often, proof of malice is found beyond the four corners of the publication at issue.
Definition of indigent
Wednesday, June 13, 2012
All day I've been like a hostage negotiator dealing with unstable maniacs
It is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness
R. v. C.S., 2012 ONCA 403 deals with a problem repeatedly seen, a question asking a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness. Such a question is improper:
[9] We need not address the numerous other arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant, with one exception. It was improper of the trial judge to ask the appellant if he knew of any reason why the complainant would make up the things she testified about.
[10] This court has held repeatedly that it is an error to call upon an accused to comment on the credibility of his or her accuser. See, for example, R. v. L.L., [2009] O.J. No. 2029 (
There but for the grace of God
Mark 2:17 They that are whole have no need of the physician, but they that are sick: I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance
Tuesday, June 12, 2012
Uh oh, Italy swears it doesn't need a bailout
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/top-business-stories/uh-oh-italy-swears-it-doesnt-need-a-bailout/article4253206/
A person can be found guilty of first degree murder as a party to the offence
R. v. Ferrari, 2012 ONCA 399 finds that, where the special mens rea requirements for murder are met, a person can be found guilty of first degree murder as a party to the offence:
(b) Party Liability under s. 21(2)
[60] The appellants submit that a person cannot be found guilty of first degree murder under s. 231(5) where their liability for murder rests on s. 21(2). Section 21(2), the provision imposing party liability for offences arising out of a common intention, provides as follows:
Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them, in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew [or ought to have known] that the commission of the offence would be a probable consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence. [Brackets added.]
[61] I have bracketed the phrase “or ought to have known” because the Supreme Court of Canada has held that to comply with the principles of fundamental justice in s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, an individual cannot be found to be a party to murder on the basis of objective foresight of death. As Lamer C.J. held in R. v. Rodney, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 687, at p. 692: “A party to a murder, therefore, cannot be convicted upon proof that he ought to have known that the murder was a probable consequence of carrying out the common purpose.” Thus, where, as here, the Crown relied upon s. 21(2) in a murder prosecution, it first had to prove that the appellants formed a common intention to carry out an unlawful purpose, for example, robbery or unlawful confinement, and that they assisted each other in carrying out the robbery or unlawful confinement. Second, the Crown had to prove that one of the appellants committed murder. Third, it had to prove that the other person (the participant or non-shooter) knew that the principal offender would probably commit murder in carrying out the unlawful purpose. This requirement of subjective foresight is crucial: see R. v. Laliberty (1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A), at pp. 107-108. In the context of this case, the non-shooter had to know that the shooter would probably cause the death of the deceased with one of the intents set out in s. 229(a) of the Code: either the intent to cause death, or the intent to cause bodily harm that the principal knew would likely cause death, being reckless whether death ensued or not.
[62] The appellants submit that while an individual may be found guilty of second degree murder by resort to s. 21(2), as modified by the Supreme Court of Canada to require subjective foresight, that provision cannot be the basis for liability for first degree murder. The submission is based on the following propositions. First, if the jury has resorted to s. 21(2), they must have rejected liability under s. 21(1), which requires an act, omission or encouragement. Second, s. 21(2) is essentially based upon mental elements—formation of an intention in common, an intention to assist and knowledge that the principal offender would probably commit murder—that are inconsistent with the kind of active participation required by the causation requirement for s. 231(5): actions that are an “essential, substantial and integral part of the killing of the victim”. This latter part of the argument is fortified by this court’s decision in R. v.
Section 21(2) must be distinguished from s. 21(1). The latter section is aimed at those who participate in the actual offence for which liability is imposed. Section 21(2) widens the circle of criminal culpability to include those who do not participate in the alleged crime but who do engage in a different criminal purpose and foresee the commission of the alleged offence by a party to that criminal purpose as a probable consequence of the pursuit of the criminal purpose: see R. v. Simpson (1988), 38 C.C.C. (3d) 481 at pp. 488-91, 46 D.L.R. (4th) 466, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 3. [Emphasis added.]
…
Where, however, liability is based on s. 21(2), there is no participation in the act which caused death but rather foresight that another would commit such an act. Culpability for the incidental offence flows almost entirely from foresight that that offence would be committed by another. [Emphasis added.]
[63] From the point of view of moral culpability or blameworthiness, an essential aspect of first degree murder, liability can be based upon s. 21(2). Justice Cory made this clear in Harbottle at p. 322:
Many if not all of the concerns expressed by the courts in the earlier cases have been eliminated by recent decisions of this Court. The concern that first degree murder should not apply to s. 21(2) parties to a murder who lacked any subjective foresight of death has been resolved by R. v. Rodney, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 687, and R. v. Logan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731. The unlawful object and felony murder provisions, another source of concern, were struck down or rendered moribund in R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633. Thus the danger of an accused's becoming subject to a first degree murder sentence in the absence of subjective blameworthiness has effectively disappeared. The earlier cases were primarily concerned with the harshness that would arise from applying a broad causation rule to parties to an offence. In my view, that cause for concern no longer exists. [Emphasis added.]
[64] However, the fact that a s. 21(2) party may have the requisite blameworthy state of mind to warrant a conviction for first degree murder does not answer the question of whether such a party sufficiently participated in the killing. As Arbour J. said in Nette at para. 62:
The degree of participation in the killing by a party whose liability for murder is based on aiding or abetting under s. 21(1)(b) or (c) of the Criminal Code or common intention under s. 21(2) of the Code, may, under the Harbottle formulation, be insufficient to permit a finding that the murder amounts to first degree under s. 231(5), which requires that the murder be committed "by that person" in the course of committing the underlying offence.
[65] The question of s. 21(2) party liability was not squarely before the court in either Harbottle or Nette. The accused in Harbottle was either a co-perpetrator in the killing or a s. 21(1)(b) or (c) party. Nette was concerned with causation for second degree murder.[2] There has been some judicial consideration of s. 21(2) by appellate courts since Harbottle. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal briefly dealt with the issue in R. v. Michaud (2000), 144 C.C.C. (3d) 62, at para. 14:
During oral argument, we drew counsel's attention to R. v. Harbottle, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 306, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 1, a case which, curiously enough, was cited neither in the appellant's nor in the respondent's written submission. In Harbottle, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the view that the question of causation under s. 214(5) (now s. 231(5)) does not require a determination of who is a party to the commission of a particular offence under s. 21 of the Code. Rather, s. 231(5) requires that the Crown prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the victim's death was substantially caused by the accused, a burden that is met only where the evidence supports a finding that the accused played a very active role -- usually a physical role -- in the killing. Section 231(5) imposes criminal liability when the actions of the accused are shown to have formed "an essential, substantial and integral part of the killing of the victim". That being so, s. 21(2) cannot be a source of criminal liability for first degree murder. [Emphasis added.]
[66] I note that the Crown conceded on the appeal in Michaud that s. 21(2) could not be combined with s. 231(5): see para. 15. On the other hand, in R. v.
The appellants argue that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury as to the degree of participation required for first degree murder pursuant to s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.
The trial judge's charge carefully tracked the five-step approach to s. 231(5) set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Harbottle (1993), 157 N.R. 349; 66 O.A.C. 358; 84 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 14.
In dealing with s. 231(5), the trial judge told the jury that in order to find the accused guilty of first degree murder, it was necessary for the Crown to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the underlying crime of domination, that is forcible confinement. He continued:
The person must be guilty of the forcible confinement. The accused must also be guilty of murder by being a party, either committing it or aiding or abetting it or being a party by subsection (2) of 21. The accused must have been shown to have participated - and this is the crux of it - in the murder in such a manner that he was the substantial cause of the death of the victim.
In my view, the trial judge's instruction was proper and I see no merit to this ground of appeal.
[67] However, a review of the factums filed in
Counsel on appeal argued that those two sections [ss. 21(2) and 231(5)] cannot be combined to found liability for first degree murder. We regard this as an open question of law. We also conclude that if the trial judge was wrong in combining the two sections as a basis for committal, the error was one of law rather than jurisdiction. Ultimately, the question on this appeal is whether there was a basis in the evidence upon which the justice could commit for trial on first degree murder.
[68] Thus, despite this court’s decision in
[69] It is true, as this court pointed out in
[70] An example can make the point more clearly. As I discuss at greater length below, in Harbottle, Cory J. gave some examples of where an accused could be convicted of first degree murder under s. 231(5). One example was described in the following terms at p. 324:
For example, if one accused with intent to kill locked the victim in a cupboard while the other set fire to that cupboard, then the accused who confined the victim might be found to have caused the death of the victim pursuant to the provisions of s. 214(5) [now s. 231(5)]. [Emphasis added.]
[71] In my view, liability under s. 231(5) would also flow if the one accused (the party), while not intending to kill the victim, knew that the principal offender would probably commit murder in carrying out the unlawful purpose, i.e., had the s. 21(2) mens rea for murder.. The participation by the party is the same whether the party intended to kill or merely knew that the principal offender would probably commit murder. Further, these acts of participation were a substantial cause of the death of the victim. I find it difficult to conceive that such a person would not have the requisite moral blameworthiness for first degree murder. Of course, a slight change in the facts might relieve the party of liability for first degree murder. If the victim was able to get out of the cupboard and was then shot by the principal offender, the acts of the party in confining the victim would not be a substantial cause of the death and the party would be guilty, at most, of second degree murder.
[72] When addressing potential liability for first degree murder, regardless of the basis upon which an accused may be guilty of murder, the trial judge must clearly focus on the additional elements of first degree murder as defined in s. 231(5) and relate the evidence to those elements. The jury must clearly understand in the context of the evidence it heard what it takes to make the accused guilty of first degree murder under s. 231(5).
Monday, June 11, 2012
Speaker green-lights 800 proposed opposition amendments to omnibus budget bill
I have one word: OY…
But Andrew Scheer said he intends to restrict the number of votes on proposed changes to the controversial budget implementation legislation, known as Bill C-38.
Deference should be given to a trial judge's Charter analysis:
[16] Deference is owed to a trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis. Where the trial judge has considered the proper factors, appellate courts should accord considerable deference to his or her ultimate determination: see Grant, at para. 86.
“The key is to try and divert people away from criminal justice in the first place… Jail is no place for the mentally ill.”
“These folks ought not to be criminalized,” Ms. Szigeti, citing a need for improved social assistance, peer support and follow-up psychiatric treatment. “The key is to try and divert people away from criminal justice in the first place… Jail is no place for the mentally ill.”
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/06/11/courting-disaster-what-do-you-do-with-repeat-offenders/
Sunday, June 10, 2012
Lawful Access Coming Back: why? Luka Rocco Magnotta!
How that dreadful case supports the proposed intrusive laws spying on Canadians is beyond me. Magnotta was not, shall we say, discreetly hiding his video production. The police didn't need a search warrant or access to internet protocols to find it -- Google or Bing would suffice.
As readers will recall, we have obscenity laws and the laws apply here. There is no need for the lawful access legislation to deal with bestgore.com.
This is just another example of intrusive and excessive criminal law legislation being supported by reference to the daily news -- an incoherent, radical and slovenly approach to lawmaking:
http://m.ctv.ca/canada/20120610/Vic-toews-on-magnotta-120610.html
Public Safety Minister Vic Toews said he is troubled by websites and Internet forums posting pictures and footage from a video believed to be linked to a Montreal murder and dismemberment case.
"I find that quite repugnant. I don't think that's necessary," Toews told CTV Question Period host Craig Oliver on Sunday. "It doesn't forward the interest of free speech at all."
When asked whether he believed it was possible for police to prosecute people who post gruesome crimes taking place on the Internet, Toews spoke of the government's efforts to update laws that oversee web content.
"It's a difficult prosecution given the state of the law today. Of course the police have been talking to me over the last six years about modernizing the law with respect to access," said Toews.
"As you know we put forward legislation that attempted to balance the public interest with privacy interests and that bill is in fact going to the committee prior to second reading," Toews said, referring to the lawful access legislation or Bill C-30.
Earlier this year, the government introduced the controversial online surveillance legislation in the House of Commons.
Telewarrant justified only where impracticality of attending in person before a Justice established
Racial equality looks different from behind bars
http://m.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/racial-equality-looks-different-from-behind-bars/article4243123/?service=mobile
