Saturday, June 23, 2012
When are injuries "caused by an automobile, by the use thereof or by the load carried in or on an automobile"?
Westmount (City) v. Rossy, 2012 SCC 30 was just released. It holds that it is enough that an accident leading to injuries take place where someone is inside a motor vehicle (even if the accident is not directly related to the operation of the vehicle) to say injuries were "caused by an automobile, by the use thereof or by the load carried in or on an automobile". Similar language appears in many statutes across Canada. While arising under Quebec law the Supreme Court considered the rest of Canada and so the decision is of some persuasive value across the country.
Gabriel Anthony Rossy was killed when a tree fell on the vehicle he was driving in the City of Westmount. His parents and three brothers filed an action in damages against the City on the basis of civil liability under the Civil Code of Québec. They alleged that, as the owner of the tree, the City had failed to properly maintain it. The City moved to dismiss the action under arts. 165(4) and 75.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It argued that the injury resulted from an accident caused by an automobile and, therefore, that any compensation for personal injury was governed by the Automobile Insurance Act .
The Supreme Court considered case law from across Canada and concluded that simply being in a vehicle when the accident occurred was enough to trigger the Automobile Insurance Act exclusion.
Specifically, the Quebec Court of Appeal's decision in Productions Pram inc. v. Lemay, [1992] R.J.Q. 1738, holds that, in determining whether the Act applies, a court must not look for a traditional causal link between fault and damage as is routinely done in delictual or quasi-delictual civil liability cases. The principles from Pram are a useful guide to the interpretation of the Act and should be reaffirmed. Each case must be considered on its facts. However, at a minimum, an accident arising out of the use of a vehicle as a means of transportation will fall within the definition of "accident" in the Act and will therefore be "caused by an automobile" within the meaning of the Act. Any civil action in connection with the damage caused by that accident will be barred and victims will have to file a claim with the Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec. The vehicle's role in the accident need not be an active one. The mere use or operation of the vehicle, as a vehicle, will be sufficient for the Act to apply.
Although the vehicle may have been stationary or moving through an intersection, the evidence on the record is that Rossy was using the vehicle as a means of transportation when the accident occurred. This is enough to find that the damage arose as a result of an "accident" within the meaning of the Act and that the no-fault benefits of the scheme are triggered.
Gabriel Anthony Rossy was killed when a tree fell on the vehicle he was driving in the City of Westmount. His parents and three brothers filed an action in damages against the City on the basis of civil liability under the Civil Code of Québec. They alleged that, as the owner of the tree, the City had failed to properly maintain it. The City moved to dismiss the action under arts. 165(4) and 75.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It argued that the injury resulted from an accident caused by an automobile and, therefore, that any compensation for personal injury was governed by the Automobile Insurance Act .
The Supreme Court considered case law from across Canada and concluded that simply being in a vehicle when the accident occurred was enough to trigger the Automobile Insurance Act exclusion.
Specifically, the Quebec Court of Appeal's decision in Productions Pram inc. v. Lemay, [1992] R.J.Q. 1738, holds that, in determining whether the Act applies, a court must not look for a traditional causal link between fault and damage as is routinely done in delictual or quasi-delictual civil liability cases. The principles from Pram are a useful guide to the interpretation of the Act and should be reaffirmed. Each case must be considered on its facts. However, at a minimum, an accident arising out of the use of a vehicle as a means of transportation will fall within the definition of "accident" in the Act and will therefore be "caused by an automobile" within the meaning of the Act. Any civil action in connection with the damage caused by that accident will be barred and victims will have to file a claim with the Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec. The vehicle's role in the accident need not be an active one. The mere use or operation of the vehicle, as a vehicle, will be sufficient for the Act to apply.
Although the vehicle may have been stationary or moving through an intersection, the evidence on the record is that Rossy was using the vehicle as a means of transportation when the accident occurred. This is enough to find that the damage arose as a result of an "accident" within the meaning of the Act and that the no-fault benefits of the scheme are triggered.
Friday, June 22, 2012
During the 16th Century Justices of the Peace presided with juries over criminal trials
There were 1,738 Justices for the whole of England in 1580. Chosen by the Lord Chancellor they did much the same work as they do today -- except they also did most criminal and family law trials.
Generally two Justices sat with a jury -- the maximum penalty they could impose was hanging.
Which was imposed with alarming regularity!!!
Generally two Justices sat with a jury -- the maximum penalty they could impose was hanging.
Which was imposed with alarming regularity!!!
Thursday, June 21, 2012
By ear we forget but paper stays put
An Inuit phrase pointing out how important it is to memorialize agreements.
An employee, who is terminated without cause, is not required to mitigate when entitled to a fixed term of notice or pay in lieu
Bowes v. Goss Power Products Ltd., 2012 ONCA 425 holds an employee, who is terminated without cause, is not required to mitigate his or her loss when entitled to a fixed term of notice or pay in lieu, and the contract of employment is silent with respect to mitigation:
[34] An employment
agreement that stipulates a fixed term of notice or payment in lieu should be treated as fixing liquidated damages or a contractual amount. It follows that, in such cases, there is no obligation on the employee to mitigate his or her damages.
[35] To reiterate, the premise of Graham, set out at para. 53, was as follows:
[A contractually fixed term of notice] is nothing more than an agreement between the parties as to the length of the reasonable notice to terminate the contract. I see no reason why there should be any distinction drawn between contracts of employment where the notice period is not stipulated and those where it is with the result that there would be a duty to mitigate in the former but not in the latter. [Emphasis added.]
[36] In my view, Nordheimer J. in Graham, and the application judge in this case, erred by treating a contractually fixed term of notice as effectively indistinguishable from common law reasonable notice.
[37] When parties contract for a specified period of notice or pay in lieu they are choosing to opt out of the common law approach applied in Bardal. In doing so, the parties should not be taken as simply attempting to replicate common law reasonable notice. The Alberta Court of Appeal explained as follows in Brown v. Pronghorn Controls Ltd., 2011 ABCA 328, 515 A.R. 128, at para. 47:
If the contract entitles the employee to payment of money, howsoever calculated, on termination, that right to that money is contractual. As such, the parties were not bound to specify an entitlement that is equal or even analogous to the quantum of reasonable notice that the common law might require if the contract was silent.
Damages for contractually stipulated notice or pay in lieu should not be analogized directly to damages for common law reasonable notice. The parties have specifically contracted for something different; it is an error to simply equate the two.
Extreme intoxication is not morally blameless
Section 33.1 of the Criminal Code says that self-induced intoxication which renders a person unaware of or incapable of controlling their behaviour is not a defence where the person is charged with an offence such as sexual assault or any other offence involving the bodily integrity of another person. Various Courts have considered whether this section is constitutional. The decision in R v. SN, 2012 NUCJ 02 upholds the validity of the section, in large part of the basis that someone who drinks themselves into a state of extreme intoxication cannot be seen as morally blameless:
[109] In my view, reasonable people do not agree that a person who drinks himself or herself to a stupor is morally innocent, at all. Reasonable people know as a matter of common sense and life experience that there is at least a connection between intoxication and violence. The Preamble to s. 33.1 enunciates a clear reflection of this common sense notion.
[110] Similarly, in my view, reasonable people support the "Scots Law" approach that intoxication, even extreme intoxication, should not excuse criminal liability, and that perpetrators of drunken violence should be held accountable. The Preamble to s. 33.1 is thus a clear reflection of what most reasonable people think in this regard.
[111] In my view, reasonable people do not agree with the prevailing view in Daviault that the criminal mind and the criminal act must be precisely contemporaneous, but rather with the more flexible dissenting opinion that people who drink themselves to a stupor possess a continuing blameworthy state of mind for subsequent violence and should not be considered morally innocent.
[112] In my view Parliament has, both in the Preamble to s. 33.1 and in the statutory provision itself, set out a clear "standard of care" which attempts to bridge the gap, conceptually, between legal theory and public expectation respecting criminal liability. [Grant, n 2, at para 50 ].
[113] I acknowledge that the notion of moral blameworthiness can be problematic. For example, one can sympathize with the high school senior who, never having had a drink, achieves an unexpected and extreme state of intoxication at the grad dance after consuming a moderate amount of alcohol. Perhaps a flexible approach to the question of what constitutes "self-induced" intoxication might be appropriate in such a case. On the other hand, there would appear to be less sympathy for the seasoned alcoholic who believes that they can control the amount they drink, but is mistaken.
[114] Finally, there is the prospect that the defence of extreme intoxication is a dodgy scientific proposition: that intoxication alone can never cause automatism, and, for example, that an alcoholic "black out" is simply mere loss of memory. There was considerable forensic testimony before the Standing Committee considering Bill C-72 (the precursor to s. 33.1) which called into question the underlying premise of extreme intoxication as a defence (Standing Committee).
[115] Parliament could, of course, have enacted s. 33.1 regardless of whether it accepted any forensic opinion which called into question the empirical validity of extreme intoxication as a defence. I am also aware that this is something which, properly, is a trial issue and not to be considered by me at this stage.
[116] It is clear, however, from both the Preamble and the plain wording of s. 33.1, Parliament was of the view that those who perpetrate drunken violence do not exactly "come to equity with clean hands by pleading 'extreme' intoxication as relief."
[117] I am of the view that the salutary benefits of s. 33.1 far outweigh any deleterious effects. Accordingly, s. 33.1 meets this proportionality requirement of the Oakes analysis.
[109] In my view, reasonable people do not agree that a person who drinks himself or herself to a stupor is morally innocent, at all. Reasonable people know as a matter of common sense and life experience that there is at least a connection between intoxication and violence. The Preamble to s. 33.1 enunciates a clear reflection of this common sense notion.
[110] Similarly, in my view, reasonable people support the "Scots Law" approach that intoxication, even extreme intoxication, should not excuse criminal liability, and that perpetrators of drunken violence should be held accountable. The Preamble to s. 33.1 is thus a clear reflection of what most reasonable people think in this regard.
[111] In my view, reasonable people do not agree with the prevailing view in Daviault that the criminal mind and the criminal act must be precisely contemporaneous, but rather with the more flexible dissenting opinion that people who drink themselves to a stupor possess a continuing blameworthy state of mind for subsequent violence and should not be considered morally innocent.
[112] In my view Parliament has, both in the Preamble to s. 33.1 and in the statutory provision itself, set out a clear "standard of care" which attempts to bridge the gap, conceptually, between legal theory and public expectation respecting criminal liability. [Grant, n 2, at para 50 ].
[113] I acknowledge that the notion of moral blameworthiness can be problematic. For example, one can sympathize with the high school senior who, never having had a drink, achieves an unexpected and extreme state of intoxication at the grad dance after consuming a moderate amount of alcohol. Perhaps a flexible approach to the question of what constitutes "self-induced" intoxication might be appropriate in such a case. On the other hand, there would appear to be less sympathy for the seasoned alcoholic who believes that they can control the amount they drink, but is mistaken.
[114] Finally, there is the prospect that the defence of extreme intoxication is a dodgy scientific proposition: that intoxication alone can never cause automatism, and, for example, that an alcoholic "black out" is simply mere loss of memory. There was considerable forensic testimony before the Standing Committee considering Bill C-72 (the precursor to s. 33.1) which called into question the underlying premise of extreme intoxication as a defence (Standing Committee).
[115] Parliament could, of course, have enacted s. 33.1 regardless of whether it accepted any forensic opinion which called into question the empirical validity of extreme intoxication as a defence. I am also aware that this is something which, properly, is a trial issue and not to be considered by me at this stage.
[116] It is clear, however, from both the Preamble and the plain wording of s. 33.1, Parliament was of the view that those who perpetrate drunken violence do not exactly "come to equity with clean hands by pleading 'extreme' intoxication as relief."
[117] I am of the view that the salutary benefits of s. 33.1 far outweigh any deleterious effects. Accordingly, s. 33.1 meets this proportionality requirement of the Oakes analysis.
Wednesday, June 20, 2012
If you are going to walk on thin ice, you might as well dance
I am told this is an Inuit proverb; maybe it is, although it sounds more like something out of Peanuts. But it does reflect a truth... .
Egypt president announcement delayed
Some might wonder if the delay is as a result of the elections authorities not being happy with the result:
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
Story here:
CAIRO—Egypt’s elections authorities say announcement of the winner of Egypt’s presidential election will be delayed but gave no new date.
The Supreme Elections Commission said in a statement Wednesday that results won’t be announced on Thursday as scheduled because it is looking into complains presented by rival candidates.
A panel of judges has to look into some 400 complaints over voting submitted by both Ahmed Shafiq, ousted leader Hosni Mubarak’s prime minister, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed Morsi’s campaign.
The delay likely will only heighten tensions gripping the country after both candidates claimed victory. The camp of Shafiq says he won with 51.5 per cent of the vote while the campaign of Morsi says he got 52 per cent to defeat Shafiq with 48 per cent.
Negligent misrepresentation and contributory negligence
The British Columbia Supreme Court in Neidermayer v. Gillies 2012 BCSC 143 reviews the relationship between negligent misrepresentation and contributory negligence at some length:
[111] The Court of Appeal in Chapeskie v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2004 BCCA 154 said:
[13] I am satisfied that findings of negligent misrepresentation and contributory negligence are not inconsistent in principle: see Avco Financial Services Realty Ltd. v. Norman, (2003), 226 D.L.R. (4th) 175 (Ont. C.A.). The question is whether the finding of contributory negligence can reasonably be supported on the facts of this case.
[112] In Citifund Capital Corp. v. Happy Valley Resort Ltd., 2010 BCSC 332, Humphries J. identified that contributory negligence can apply to negligent misrepresentation, but that it cannot relate to the reasonableness of the reliance. It was held:
112 The concept of contributory negligence can apply to a case of negligent misrepresentation (see Avco Financial Services Realty Ltd. v. Norman (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 239 (Ont. C.A.), accepted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Chapeskie v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2004 BCCA 154 (B.C. C.A.)). However, the concept of contributory negligence cannot relate to the reasonableness of the reliance. That issue falls to be decided on the main question of whether there was reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation. The issue of contributory negligence arises in the consideration of whether the relevant party failed to consider that it may harm itself if it did not act reasonably and prudently. Neither party addressed this issue, each treating this case as "all or nothing" for their respective positions.
[113] The relationship between contributory negligence and negligent misrepresentation is aptly summarized in Avco Financial Services Realty Ltd. v. Norman, (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 239 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 32:
[32] On the question of contributory negligence, the focus is on the event that occasioned the loss. The injured party's conduct, in all the circumstances surrounding that event, must be considered in order to determine whether it acted reasonably in its own interest or whether it contributed to the loss by its own fault. The circumstances surrounding the event that occasioned the loss, depending on the particular facts of the case, may be much wider in scope than the circumstances surrounding the negligent misrepresentation. Hence, at this stage of the inquiry, the reasonableness of the injured party's reliance on the misrepresentation must be assessed in the context of the event that occasioned the loss. According to the test for contributory negligence set out earlier at paragraph 26, the injured party will be found guilty of contributory negligence if it ought to have foreseen that it may harm itself by failing to act reasonably and prudently. In this context, the injured party's failure to act as a reasonable and prudent person may include a failure to guard against the foreseeable carelessness of others.
[Emphasis added.]
[114] The Ontario Court of Appeal also said:
[34] A similar result was reached in Spiewak, supra. A real estate agent was found liable in negligent misrepresentation in respect of incomplete and misleading information provided to prospective purchasers of an apartment building about the building's likely rental income. The plaintiffs relied on this information and entered into an agreement to purchase the building, as a result of which they sustained a loss. The plaintiffs, however, were found contributorily negligent because of their failure to consult a lawyer in respect of the transaction and their damages were accordingly reduced by 20%.
[35] It is my view that an approach that allows for the apportionment of fault in cases of negligent misrepresentation is not only consistent with the approach in other negligence cases, it is also consistent with the principle underlying the very concept of contributory negligence. This principle is rooted in a concern to do justice as between the parties; it was reiterated in Bow Valley, supra, where the court quoted with approval at para. 73 the words of Viscount Simon in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co., [1951] A.C. 601 at 611 (P.C.):
But when contributory negligence is set up as a defence, its existence does not depend on any duty owed by the injured party to the party sued, and all that is necessary to establish such a defence is to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the injured party did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed, by this want of care, to his own injury. For when contributory negligence is set up as a shield against the obligation to satisfy the whole of the plaintiff's claim, the principle involved is that, where a man is part author of his own injury, he cannot call on the other party to compensate him in full.
[Emphasis added.]
[111] The Court of Appeal in Chapeskie v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2004 BCCA 154 said:
[13] I am satisfied that findings of negligent misrepresentation and contributory negligence are not inconsistent in principle: see Avco Financial Services Realty Ltd. v. Norman, (2003), 226 D.L.R. (4th) 175 (Ont. C.A.). The question is whether the finding of contributory negligence can reasonably be supported on the facts of this case.
[112] In Citifund Capital Corp. v. Happy Valley Resort Ltd., 2010 BCSC 332, Humphries J. identified that contributory negligence can apply to negligent misrepresentation, but that it cannot relate to the reasonableness of the reliance. It was held:
112 The concept of contributory negligence can apply to a case of negligent misrepresentation (see Avco Financial Services Realty Ltd. v. Norman (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 239 (Ont. C.A.), accepted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Chapeskie v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2004 BCCA 154 (B.C. C.A.)). However, the concept of contributory negligence cannot relate to the reasonableness of the reliance. That issue falls to be decided on the main question of whether there was reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation. The issue of contributory negligence arises in the consideration of whether the relevant party failed to consider that it may harm itself if it did not act reasonably and prudently. Neither party addressed this issue, each treating this case as "all or nothing" for their respective positions.
[113] The relationship between contributory negligence and negligent misrepresentation is aptly summarized in Avco Financial Services Realty Ltd. v. Norman, (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 239 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 32:
[32] On the question of contributory negligence, the focus is on the event that occasioned the loss. The injured party's conduct, in all the circumstances surrounding that event, must be considered in order to determine whether it acted reasonably in its own interest or whether it contributed to the loss by its own fault. The circumstances surrounding the event that occasioned the loss, depending on the particular facts of the case, may be much wider in scope than the circumstances surrounding the negligent misrepresentation. Hence, at this stage of the inquiry, the reasonableness of the injured party's reliance on the misrepresentation must be assessed in the context of the event that occasioned the loss. According to the test for contributory negligence set out earlier at paragraph 26, the injured party will be found guilty of contributory negligence if it ought to have foreseen that it may harm itself by failing to act reasonably and prudently. In this context, the injured party's failure to act as a reasonable and prudent person may include a failure to guard against the foreseeable carelessness of others.
[Emphasis added.]
[114] The Ontario Court of Appeal also said:
[34] A similar result was reached in Spiewak, supra. A real estate agent was found liable in negligent misrepresentation in respect of incomplete and misleading information provided to prospective purchasers of an apartment building about the building's likely rental income. The plaintiffs relied on this information and entered into an agreement to purchase the building, as a result of which they sustained a loss. The plaintiffs, however, were found contributorily negligent because of their failure to consult a lawyer in respect of the transaction and their damages were accordingly reduced by 20%.
[35] It is my view that an approach that allows for the apportionment of fault in cases of negligent misrepresentation is not only consistent with the approach in other negligence cases, it is also consistent with the principle underlying the very concept of contributory negligence. This principle is rooted in a concern to do justice as between the parties; it was reiterated in Bow Valley, supra, where the court quoted with approval at para. 73 the words of Viscount Simon in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co., [1951] A.C. 601 at 611 (P.C.):
But when contributory negligence is set up as a defence, its existence does not depend on any duty owed by the injured party to the party sued, and all that is necessary to establish such a defence is to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the injured party did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed, by this want of care, to his own injury. For when contributory negligence is set up as a shield against the obligation to satisfy the whole of the plaintiff's claim, the principle involved is that, where a man is part author of his own injury, he cannot call on the other party to compensate him in full.
[Emphasis added.]
Tuesday, June 19, 2012
Beneficiary has no property interest in any specific asset of the trust
Spencer v. Riesberry, 2012 ONCA 418 is a lengthy decision dealing with trusts and family law. In the decision the Court made a useful comment about the beneficiary's lack of property interest in the trust res:
[37] Unless the terms of the trust expressly provide otherwise, a beneficiary has no property interest in any specific asset of the trust, prior to or absent an appropriation of such asset to the beneficiary by the trustee: see Gennaro v. Gennaro (1994), 111 D.L.R. (4th) 379 (Ont. Unif. Fam. Ct.).
[37] Unless the terms of the trust expressly provide otherwise, a beneficiary has no property interest in any specific asset of the trust, prior to or absent an appropriation of such asset to the beneficiary by the trustee: see Gennaro v. Gennaro (1994), 111 D.L.R. (4th) 379 (Ont. Unif. Fam. Ct.).
Standard of review for summary judgment
Scott & Associates Engineering Ltd. v. Finavera Renewables Inc., 2012 ABCA 181 is a useful source for the standard of review for summary judgment in Alberta. While based on the Alberta Rules the point about "correctness" regarding questions of law should apply generally:
The standard of review on an appeal of a summary judgment decision is correctness on questions of law, and palpable and overriding error on questions of fact: Poliquin v Devon Canada Corporation, 2009 ABCA 216 at para 8, 454 AR 61.
The standard of review on an appeal of a summary judgment decision is correctness on questions of law, and palpable and overriding error on questions of fact: Poliquin v Devon Canada Corporation, 2009 ABCA 216 at para 8, 454 AR 61.
Clearly not Nunavut - the clue? The wood; Nunavut is above the tree line
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| Another clue, the bears here are generally all white ... . |
Monday, June 18, 2012
Self induced drug intoxication does not support a not criminally responsible disposition
R. v. Evans, 2012 ONCA 412 is a helpful source for the principle that a self induced drug intoxication does not support a not criminally responsible disposition:
[12] The respondent relies on R.v.Bouchard-Lebrun, 2011 S.C.C. 58 and concedes that: (a) if the psychotic symptoms exhibited by the appellant at the time of the offence were the product of self-induced drug intoxication, this would not support a finding of NCRMD; and (b) an antisocial personality disorder alone does not meet the s. 16 criteria for a finding of NCRMD.
Analysis
[13] An individual is presumed to be criminally responsible for his or her actions. Section 16(1) of the Code provides an exception to that general principle:
No person is criminally responsible for an act committed or an omission made while suffering from a mental disorder that rendered the person incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong.
[14] A person found NCRMD may appeal on the basis that the verdict amounts to a "miscarriage of justice": s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Code.
[15] In this case, the appellant was found to be NCRMD on the basis that he suffered from schizophrenia. That diagnosis has been ruled out by the appellant's treatment team. Additionally, Dr. Komer has testified that the "best fit" for the appellant at the time of the offence was a substance-induced psychosis. The respondent concedes that a self-induced substance-induced psychosis would not support an NCRMD finding. In these circumstances, the NCRMD verdict cannot be sustained and should be set aside. It amounts to a miscarriage of justice.
[12] The respondent relies on R.v.Bouchard-Lebrun, 2011 S.C.C. 58 and concedes that: (a) if the psychotic symptoms exhibited by the appellant at the time of the offence were the product of self-induced drug intoxication, this would not support a finding of NCRMD; and (b) an antisocial personality disorder alone does not meet the s. 16 criteria for a finding of NCRMD.
Analysis
[13] An individual is presumed to be criminally responsible for his or her actions. Section 16(1) of the Code provides an exception to that general principle:
No person is criminally responsible for an act committed or an omission made while suffering from a mental disorder that rendered the person incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong.
[14] A person found NCRMD may appeal on the basis that the verdict amounts to a "miscarriage of justice": s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Code.
[15] In this case, the appellant was found to be NCRMD on the basis that he suffered from schizophrenia. That diagnosis has been ruled out by the appellant's treatment team. Additionally, Dr. Komer has testified that the "best fit" for the appellant at the time of the offence was a substance-induced psychosis. The respondent concedes that a self-induced substance-induced psychosis would not support an NCRMD finding. In these circumstances, the NCRMD verdict cannot be sustained and should be set aside. It amounts to a miscarriage of justice.
Judge to rule on whether obesity is factor in man's fitness for fatherhood
It is difficult to think of a much more offensive consideration than this - well, maybe asking if a father's religion makes him unfit would count. How about saying, 'listen you are hard of hearing, you better not be a father'; or 'you don't have a lot of education you shouldn't be a mom'.
Here is a man who has turned his life around, lost a lot of weight and seeks his kids.
But the response? 'You were fat, you are fat still (just less so) so forget your kids'.
For shame!
Story from Ottawa Citizen here
OTTAWA — In a family court case to be ruled on soon, a judge will, in part, decide whether a 38-year-old Ottawa man is too fat to be a dad.
The Royal Ottawa Hospital's family court clinic, which does court-ordered assessments on parents, is now using obesity as a factor when deciding if parents are fit to raise children.
In court filings by child-welfare authorities in the case of an obese Ottawa father who is fighting for custody of his two boys, a doctor at the family court clinic wrote:
"Finally, (father) has struggled with obesity for years, which impacts significantly on most aspects of his life including (his) functioning as a parent. He was short of breath or winded in simply walking short distances about the clinic and he lacks both the mobility and stamina required to keep up with young and active children."
Here is a man who has turned his life around, lost a lot of weight and seeks his kids.
But the response? 'You were fat, you are fat still (just less so) so forget your kids'.
For shame!
Story from Ottawa Citizen here
OTTAWA — In a family court case to be ruled on soon, a judge will, in part, decide whether a 38-year-old Ottawa man is too fat to be a dad.
The Royal Ottawa Hospital's family court clinic, which does court-ordered assessments on parents, is now using obesity as a factor when deciding if parents are fit to raise children.
In court filings by child-welfare authorities in the case of an obese Ottawa father who is fighting for custody of his two boys, a doctor at the family court clinic wrote:
"Finally, (father) has struggled with obesity for years, which impacts significantly on most aspects of his life including (his) functioning as a parent. He was short of breath or winded in simply walking short distances about the clinic and he lacks both the mobility and stamina required to keep up with young and active children."
Anything you say can and will be used against you!
Airports and border crossings in Canada are being wired with high-definition cameras and microphones that can eavesdrop on travelers' conversations, according to the Canada Border Services Agency. A CBSA statement said audio-video monitoring and recording is already in place at unidentified CBSA sites at airports and border points of entry as part of an effort to enhance "border integrity, infrastructure and asset security and health and safety." "It is important to note that even though audio technology is installed, no audio is recorded at this time. It will become functional at a later date," CBSA spokesman Chris Kealey said in a statement.
Sunday, June 17, 2012
Happy Fathers' Day
Iqaluit
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| Nanuq |
Andrew Coyne is right and wrong
Here's part of what he says in today's column:
"The more natural modern coalition, it seems to me, is between economic liberals (in the European sense) and social liberals; between free marketers and environmentalists (it's all about minimizing waste), between advocates of consumer power and voter power. There are free marketers who vote Conservative only because they have to — who are uncomfortable with their so-con bedfellows, dismayed by the party's indifference to environmental issues, and appalled by its assault on parliamentary democracy, but who can find no other party they trust on the economy."
This is totally correct.
There are many in the Conservative Party who aren't comfortable there -- indeed there are some in the NDP who are not comfortable either.
There is room for a clearly defined Party that respects parliament, the environment, leaves people to make their own life choices freely and supports free markets. That is a Party I can support. That is a Party I do support. That Party is the Liberal Party.
And that's where Coyne goes wrong -- because he says that Party doesn't exist and, specifically, the Liberal Party ain't it.
http://www.nationalpost.com/m/news/blog.html?b=fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2012/06/15/andrew-coyne-plenty-of-room-for-a-tell-it-like-it-is-third-party-sadly-the-liberals-arent-that&pubdate=2012-06-16
"The more natural modern coalition, it seems to me, is between economic liberals (in the European sense) and social liberals; between free marketers and environmentalists (it's all about minimizing waste), between advocates of consumer power and voter power. There are free marketers who vote Conservative only because they have to — who are uncomfortable with their so-con bedfellows, dismayed by the party's indifference to environmental issues, and appalled by its assault on parliamentary democracy, but who can find no other party they trust on the economy."
This is totally correct.
There are many in the Conservative Party who aren't comfortable there -- indeed there are some in the NDP who are not comfortable either.
There is room for a clearly defined Party that respects parliament, the environment, leaves people to make their own life choices freely and supports free markets. That is a Party I can support. That is a Party I do support. That Party is the Liberal Party.
And that's where Coyne goes wrong -- because he says that Party doesn't exist and, specifically, the Liberal Party ain't it.
http://www.nationalpost.com/m/news/blog.html?b=fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2012/06/15/andrew-coyne-plenty-of-room-for-a-tell-it-like-it-is-third-party-sadly-the-liberals-arent-that&pubdate=2012-06-16
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