Sunday, March 9, 2014
Friday, March 7, 2014
OTTAWA, March 7, 2014 – The Honourable Peter MacKay, P.C., Q.C., M.P. for Central Nova, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, today announced the following appointment:
The Honourable Victor E. Toews is appointed a judge of the Court of Queen's Bench of Manitoba to replace Mr. Justice D.P. Bryk, who elected to become a supernumerary judge as of February 16, 2014.
Mr. Justice Toews received a Bachelor of Laws from Robson Hall, University of Manitoba, in 1976 and was admitted to the Bar of Manitoba in 1977. He received an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Winnipeg in 2011.
Mr. Justice Toews was a Member of Parliament for twelve years and also served as a member of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly for almost five years. He served as Minister of Public Safety of Canada (2010-2013), President of the Treasury Board of Canada (2007-2010), Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada (2006-2007), Justice Critic for the Official Opposition (2000-2006), Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Manitoba (1997-1999), and Minister of Labour of Manitoba (1995-1997).
Mr. Justice Toews also served as Director of Constitutional Law (1987-1991) and Crown Counsel for Criminal Prosecutions (1977-1979), Manitoba Department of Justice. In addition to this, he served as in-house counsel to the Great West Life Assurance Company in from 1991 to 1995 and again in 1999. His main areas of practice were criminal law, constitutional law, administrative law, and employment and labour law.
Mr. Justice Toews was an instructor at the Labour Studies Branch of the Department of Economics at the University of Manitoba (1988-1995) and has delivered numerous lectures and speeches to various organizations on legal and parliamentary matters.
This appointment is effective immediately.
R. v. Hutchinson 2014 SCC 19:
 As we have seen, "fraud" for the purposes of consent has two elements: (1) dishonesty, which can include the non-disclosure of important facts; and (2) deprivation or risk of deprivation in the form of serious bodily harm which results from the dishonesty: Cuerrier. Did the Crown prove that no consent was obtained by virtue of fraud?
 The dishonesty in this case is evident and admitted. Mr. Hutchinson obtained the complainant's consent to sexual intercourse only by failing to disclose the critical fact that he had sabotaged the condoms and thereby compromised their contraceptive value. The only remaining issue is whether there was a sufficient deprivation to establish fraud.
 Mr. Hutchinson argues that the universal threshold for deprivation under s. 265(3)(c) post-Cuerrier is a "significant risk of serious bodily harm", and that the Crown did not establish that here. The Crown argues that a new trial is required to determine whether the risk of pregnancy caused by the sabotaged condoms constituted a "significant risk of serious bodily harm". These arguments over-read Cuerrier. The Court in Cuerrier was addressing the specific risk of sexually transmitted diseases. It did not foreclose the possibility that other types of harm may amount to equally serious deprivations and therefore suffice to establish the requirements of fraud under s. 265(3)(c).
 The concept of "harm" does not encompass only bodily harm in the traditional sense of that term; it includes at least the sorts of profound changes in a woman's body — changes that may be welcomed or changes that a woman may choose not to accept — resulting from pregnancy. Depriving a woman of the choice whether to become pregnant or increasing the risk of pregnancy is equally serious as a "significant risk of serious bodily harm" within the meaning of Cuerrier, and therefore suffices to establish fraud vitiating consent under s. 265(3)(c).
 We conclude that where a complainant has chosen not to become pregnant, deceptions that deprive her of the benefit of that choice by making her pregnant, or exposing her to an increased risk of becoming pregnant by removing effective birth control, may constitute a sufficiently serious deprivation for the purposes of fraud vitiating consent under s. 265(3)(c).
Thursday, March 6, 2014