Thursday, April 17, 2014

Annulment for lack of consummation

Annulment is a rare proceeding in modern Canadian law.  That said, it is available and proof of non-consummation does not require independent evidence.

So the Ontario Court of Appeal set aside the application judge’s order and granted an annulment where the parties agreed that the marriage had never been consummated. The application judge erred in concluding there had to be independent evidence of incurability. It was a reasonable inference that the respondent husband was unable to consummate this marriage to this woman, which sufficed for an annulment: Gupta v. Garg, 2014 ONCA 217

Landmark ruling on rights of Métis upheld


The Federal Court of Appeal has upheld a ruling from last year that said Ottawa is constitutionally responsible for the 400,000 Métis in Canada as a distinct aboriginal group, but overturned a similar decision about non-status Indians.

The appeal court decision released Thursday will likely be appealed to the Supreme Court. But, if it is ultimately upheld, it means the government would have to negotiate with the Metis on outstanding rights claims and other potential benefits in the same way it now must deal with the First Nations and the Inuit.

 “This is a huge win for the Métis,” said Jason Madden, the lawyer for the counsel for Manitoba Métis 
Federation. “It answers one of the key questions which has been one of the obstacles put in front of them, whether it is dealing with their rights, claims, programs and services available for them. Now it is unquestionable that the federal government has primary responsibility to deal with the Métis.”

But the appeal court also found that, if non-status Indians are to be counted among Canada’s aboriginal people, they are to be included with the Indians. Which means the government may still have to negotiate with them as they do with members of the First Nations, but the court left open the question of whether non-status Indians are entitled to the same rights and benefits as status Indians.

"Non-status Indians" commonly refers to people who identify themselves as Indians but who, because of mixed ancestry or any of a number of other reasons, are not entitled to the programs, services, rights and benefits that flow to status Indians under the Constitution, the Indian Act and the treaties that have been negotiated with First Nations.

Aboriginal Affairs Minister Bernard Valcourt said that, given complex legal issues raised by the previous Federal Court decision, it was prudent for Canada to obtain a decision from a higher court. “We are pleased that the court granted part of our appeal,” Mr. Valcourt said in an e-mail, “and we are reviewing all elements of today’s decision to determine next steps.”

The original ruling last year by Justice Michael Phelan of the Federal Court said the Métis and “non-status” Indians qualify as “Indians” under the 1867 Constitution Act.


Because there are possibly one million Métis and non-status Indians, which is just slightly more than the number of status Indians Ottawa recognizes, the decision had the potential of doubling the number of Indians for which Ottawa is constitutionally responsible and could force Ottawa to make radical policy changes, add billions in new spending, or both.

Happy Bear


Preferring the evidence of a police witness as having extra credibility is not proper

Laver v. Swrjeski, 2014 ONCA 294 deals with reasonable apprehension of bias.   Preferring the evidence of a police witness as having extra credibility is not proper:

Issue 1: Did certain comments made by the application judge during the argument of the application create a reasonable apprehension of bias?
[17]   The issue of reasonable apprehension of bias was most recently discussed and considered by this court in Martin v. Sansome, 2014 ONCA 14. In that case, the context was interventions by a trial judge during the examination of witnesses. This court set out the legal framework for the assessment of bias in the following passage at paras. 31-33:
[31] Bias is a predisposition to decide an issue or cause in a certain way that does not leave the judicial mind open and impartial: Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259, at para. 58. The burden of establishing bias is on the party arguing that it exists. The test, found in Wewaykum, at para. 60, is long-established:
[W]hat would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude[?] Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly[?]
[32] There is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality. The threshold is high for finding an apprehension of bias: Wewaykum, at para. 76.
[33] In Chippewas of Mnjikaning First Nation v. Chiefs of Ontario, 2010 ONCA 47, 265 O.A.C. 247, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 33613 (July 18, 2010), at para. 230, this court provided additional guidance:
A determination of whether a trial judge’s interventions give rise to a reasonable apprehension of unfairness is a fact-specific inquiry and must be assessed in relation to the facts and circumstances of a particular trial. The test is an objective one. Thus, the trial record must be assessed in its totality and the interventions complained of must be evaluated cumulatively rather than as isolated occurrences, from the perspective of a reasonable observer throughout the trial.
[18]   In Martin v. Sansome, the appellant was a self-represented litigant. The trial judge tried to help him with procedural issues, but was apparently impatient and frustrated with the slow progress of the trial. On appeal, the court concluded, at para. 39, that, although some of the trial judge’s comments could create the impression of favouring the respondent when viewed in isolation, when the entire record was viewed as a whole, the court was not satisfied that “a reasonable person would have the impression that the trial judge was predisposed to decide the issues before him in favour of the respondent.”
[19]   In this case, the comments of the application judge did not come in the context of witness testimony but during the oral argument of the application. The application judge made two types of comments that could raise a concern in the mind of a reasonable person that he was predisposed to decide the issues before him in favour of the respondent.
[20]   The first were comments about the credibility of police officers and his concern about making an adverse credibility finding about a police officer. In this case the respondent and his common law wife were officers while the appellant, the mother, was not.
[21]   The second was a number of adverse comments about the credibility of the appellant which were based on misapprehensions of the evidence or the law.
[22]   The following are examples of some of the comments made by the application judge:
Excerpt group #1:
Mr. Spiteri: …That has to be viewed in light of all of the evidence. As the Court of Appeal said itself, you look at it all, including the credibility of the witnesses, the credibility of the parties. In terms of the evidence, you have the affidavit evidence. In terms of the evidence, you have Affidavit evidence…
The Court: Okay, let me stop you there. That’s my concern, gentlemen, and let me just lay it on the line. Someone is not being truthful, and we have police officers, whom I know and respect and, gentlemen, you’re asking me to make a finding that one of them isn’t being truthful, and I’m prepared to do that, but there’d better be some strong, strong evidence.
I have to make a finding of credibility, and I don’t want to do that with police officers and with senior police officers, because I – as my recently deceased father said, “Your reputation is like your virginity, son. You lose it once”, and I don’t want to make a decision on the record, available to the public, where I am forced to say one side is being truthful and one side is not, so I simply – that’s the elephant in the room, gentlemen, because of what these folks do for a living. I wouldn’t be so concerned if they were federal civil servants. Frankly, I wouldn’t be concerned at all, but they are Ottawa police officers, who I have huge respect for, given that I was a defence lawyer for 23 years, and reputation is all they have. It’s all we have as lawyers, judges, everybody, so I’m just letting you know. I’m very troubled by what I may have to do.
… I’m going to make a finding that someone is not being truthful, and if I’m a police officer or a judge or a lawyer or somebody else, I don’t want somebody making a finding that I’m not truthful, and unless there’s some other way that I can decide this case without making that finding, I don’t know how I can. I don’t know, gentlemen, I’m asking.
...
But you understand my concern and my uber-sensitivity given that I’ve work – you know, I’ve done cases with all these officers. I don’t know them personally. I know them professionally, and so that’s my – and maybe I’m being over-sensitive here because of my background, but all you have is a reputation, gentlemen…
Mr. Spiteri: And I do want to qualify this, Your Honour. I’m not suggesting that Mr. Swrjeski is a liar. That’s not what I’m suggesting.
The Court: Okay, thank goodness, because I’m going to have a real hard time making that kind of finding. I think, except being called a child molester, being called a liar is about the about the worst thing you can possibly be called.
Mr. Spiteri: That’s not…
The Court: Okay, so I just – okay, that makes me feel much better, because I’m not comfortable using that word with professional people.
The Court: Take your time, please, because I can tell you both, gentlemen, this case is not going to be decided – I’m not going to make any finding nailing anybody’s reputation here. The case is going to be decided based on the evidence and based on the balance of probabilities, but there’s no way that I’m going to make a finding that either one of your clients is lying or misleading or anything like that; not going to happen.
It’s based on evidence, just so we’re clear, so when you’re making your reply you might want to deal with that issue, because I’m very uncomfortable because I know these people. I worked with them for a long time, so I even thought, frankly, I was going to excuse myself, but then I thought, no, I don’t know them that well. I’ve never, you know, socialised with them ever. I’ve just had them as – when they accused my client of wrongdoing- or clients. Anyway, go ahead. Carry on.
Excerpt group #2:
The Court: Because just by her own financial statement, the woman at the very least is worth over a hundred grand, so that’s – I have a problem with that poor as a church mouse impression when the reality is, you know, you’re not. (Referring to the appellant)
Excerpt group #3:
The Court: … So I’m just saying: that causes me a great deal of concern when basically the only document that you can refer to as a so-called “document” is this one where he says “Owed to Louise, 35,000” and then he gives an explanation saying “Look, take the money. As long as I have my daughter I’m fine”. That’s your strongest piece of evidence versus the other. So we’re going to take 10 minutes, speak to your client and see if we can come up with some explanation or something, because you know, worst case scenario, she’s sworn a false affidavit. Best case scenario, there’s a confusion or a misunderstanding about filling out the form and whoever her family lawyer was didn’t explain it to her properly. But you can’t say you’re paying these expenses when the evidence is you’re not paying a dime. I have a concern about that.
Excerpt group #4:
The Court: … Go to part 7-F, counsel. “Money owed to you”. Why is that zero? If she regarded this money as a loan why is that zero? Even 35 – like, I can understand not putting 70. I get that, because half of it is her daughter’s. I understand that. But why doesn’t she indicate that “I’m owed 35,000 by my son-in-law”?
Mr. Spiteri: And I go back to what I said earlier. The two, Mr. and Mrs. Laver, had treated this inheritance – remember: these documents were prepared for purposes of NFP. It was for family law purposes.
The Court: Sure.
Mr. Spiteri: And she…
The Court: But they still have to be accurate, Mr. Spiteri.
Mr. Spiteri: Fair enough. And all…
The Court: And you’re under oath. 
Excerpt group #5:
The Court: Well no. A disability payment is tax free,
Mr. Spiteri. I know that.
Mr. Spiteri: It says “income tax deducted from pay”.
The Court: Well, that might well be, but what I do know is a disability pension is tax free. So maybe she has some other monies coming in but you don’t – it’s illegal to tax a disability pension. You can’t tax it.
Mr. Spiteri: I think, Your Honour, that’s dependent on who paid the premium.
The Court: Okay.
Mr. Spiteri: If the premium was paid exclusively by the insured, then that’s quite right, that’s the case.
The Court: Is your client paying income tax or not?
Mr. Spiteri: Well, I’m only looking at this. And it’s saying here $264 is paid in income tax.
The Court: Well why don’t you ask her? She’s here. Was her disability pension tax free or not?
Ms. Laver: No, it wasn’t.
Mr. Spiteri: It was not tax free.
The Court: Okay. All right. Go ahead.
[23]   Excerpt group 1 contains the comments by the application judge where he indicates that he would have trouble making a credibility finding against a police officer, and later suggests that he had considered recusing himself because of his feelings of connection to Ottawa police officers with whom he used to work when he was in legal practice as a criminal lawyer.
[24]   As it turned out, the application judge believed the respondent, a police officer, and accepted his explanation for disowning the document that on its face is an acknowledgement of debt to the appellant. He disbelieved the appellant, who is not a police officer.
[25]   Applying the test for reasonable apprehension of bias, in my view it is clear that a reasonable observer would conclude that it was more likely than not that, consciously or unconsciously, the application judge would not impartially decide whom to believe. The application judge’s comments indicate his partiality to the evidence given by police officers. Even though he gave other reasons for deciding whose evidence he believed, those reasons are tainted by his comments.
[26]   Excerpts 2, 3 and 4 are examples of comments about the appellant’s credibility, and where the application judge asked counsel to ask the appellant for an explanation, although there was no oral evidence being taken. Again, in my view, the application judge’s comments created a reasonable apprehension of bias, by making clear that he challenged the appellant’s explanations for perceived inconsistencies in documents that were collateral to the application, and that, before the conclusion of the application, he had decided that he did not believe the appellant.
[27]   Finally, excerpt 5 is an example of the application judge’s comments regarding an issue of the taxability of a disability pension. The application judge was mistaken on the issue but appeared to insist on his view in the face of the evidence to the contrary on the appellant’s document, which specifically stated that tax had been deducted. Based on his misunderstanding regarding the taxability of the pension, the application judge appeared to conclude that the appellant had kept more money from her pension than she actually had indicated. In my view, the application judge’s attitude towards the evidence of the appellant added to the impression of a reasonable observer that the application judge would be unable to assess the appellant’s evidence with impartiality.
[28]   In aggregate, these comments, when considered in the context of the hearing as a whole, would cause a reasonable person to believe that the application judge was predisposed to make the credibility determinations before him in favour of the respondent.


Tipi and sweat lodge at the North Bay Jail

Unreasonable Verdict

R v PRL, 2014 SKCA 38:

[9]        The standard of review is set out in R. v. Yebes1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168: “The Court must determine on the whole of the evidence whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered” (para. 25). An appeal court may not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact.
[10]   In R. v. R.P.2012 SCC 22 (CanLII), 2012 SCC 22, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 746, the Court stated the following:
9         To decide whether a verdict is unreasonable, an appellate court must, as this Court held in R. v. Yebes1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, and R. v. Biniaris2000 SCC 15 (CanLII), 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 36, determine whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury or a judge could reasonably have rendered. The appellate court may also find a verdict unreasonable if the trial judge has drawn an inference or made a finding of fact essential to the verdict that (1) is plainly contradicted by the evidence relied on by the trial judge in support of that inference or finding, or (2) is shown to be incompatible with evidence that has not otherwise been contradicted or rejected by the trial judge (R. v. Sinclair2011 SCC 40 (CanLII), 2011 SCC 40, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 4, 16 and 19-21; R. v. Beaudry2007 SCC 5 (CanLII), 2007 SCC 5, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190).

10        Whereas the question whether a verdict is reasonable is one of law, whether a witness is credible is a question of fact. A court of appeal that reviews a trial court’s assessments of credibility in order to determine, for example, whether the verdict is reasonable cannot interfere with those assessments unless it is established that they “cannot be supported on any reasonable view of the evidence” (R. v. Burke1996 CanLII 229 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 474, at para. 7).