Liberals: 27.8 (+1.1)
NDP: 16.0 (-1.0)
Green: 13.4 (+2.2)
Bloc Quebecois: 9.8 (+0.6)
Undecided: 14.7
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
416 225 2777
R. v. Blake, 2010 ONCA 1, released today, is one of the first significant considerations of the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Grant (2009), 245 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). As such it is a helpful review and application of the new test for exclusion of evidence for breaches of Charter rights or freedoms:
[21] In Grant, the Supreme Court of Canada took a judicial wire brush to the 20 years of jurisprudential gloss that had built up around s. 24(2) and scrubbed down to the bare words of the section. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Charron, writing for the majority, observed at para. 67 that “[t]he words of s. 24(2) capture its purpose: to maintain the good repute of the administration of justice”. They continued at para. 68:
The phrase “bring the administration of justice into disrepute” must be understood in the long-term sense of maintaining the integrity of, and public confidence in, the justice system. Exclusion of evidence resulting in an acquittal may provoke immediate criticism. But s. 24(2) does not focus on immediate reaction to the individual case. Rather, it looks to whether the overall repute of the justice system, viewed in the long term, will be adversely affected by admission of the evidence. The inquiry is objective. It asks whether a reasonable person, informed of all relevant circumstances and the values underlying the Charter, would conclude that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
[22] The majority identified three lines of inquiry that are relevant to the identification and balancing of the interests at play when s. 24(2) is invoked. According to the majority, the trial court must examine the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, the impact of the Charter violation on the Charter-protected interest of the accused and society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.
[23] The inquiry into the nature of the state conduct that resulted in a Charter breach seeks to place that conduct along a continuum of misconduct. As explained in Grant, at paras. 72-74, the graver the state’s misconduct the stronger the need to preserve the long-term repute of the administration of justice by disassociating the court’s processes from that misconduct. That disassociation is achieved by excluding the evidentiary fruits of the state misconduct.
[24] The trial judge found that the police acted in “good faith” in their attempt to acquire legal authorization for the search. I accept that finding. The police were clearly aware of the need to obtain a warrant and proceeded accordingly. They cannot be said to have acted negligently or in ignorance of any of the applicable Charter requirements. A finding of “good faith” obviously reduces the need for the court to disassociate itself from the state conduct that resulted in the Charter infringement, and supports the admissibility of the challenged evidence.
[25] Not only do I agree with the trial judge’s finding of good faith on the part of the investigators, I can see no possible criticism of the police conduct on this trial record. Throughout the process that culminated in the seizure of the evidence, they acted exactly as they were obligated to under the law. They were required to obtain a warrant before entering the residence. They did so. They were required to make full disclosure to the justice of the peace. There is no suggestion that they did not do so. The police, and later the Crown, were legally obligated to protect the identity of the confidential informants by removing all material from the information that could identify the informants before making that material available to the defence. They did that. Given the manner in which the s. 8 claim was litigated, the police acted not only in good faith, but as required by the law. The police conduct in this case does not fit anywhere on the misconduct continuum described in Grant, at para. 74.
[26] The police conduct in this case is somewhat analogous to the conduct considered in cases where the police have gathered evidence according to the law as it was understood at the time the evidence was gathered only to have the law changed or declared unconstitutional at some subsequent point, but before the evidence is tendered at trial: see e.g. R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, at pp. 59-60; R. v. Wijesinha, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 422, at paras. 55-56. In those cases, the police acted not only in good faith, but in accordance with the law as it stood at the time. Under the Collins approach, real evidence obtained in this manner was inevitably admitted.
[27] The nature of the state conduct resulting in the constitutional infringement in this case seems to fall outside the paradigm described in Grant. If it is within that paradigm, it is clearly at the far end of the spectrum favouring admissibility. The appellant has not availed himself of the various options open to him that would potentially have allowed further assessment of the police conduct. In these circumstances it would be inappropriate to presume that the police did anything other than conduct themselves in accordance with the applicable legal rules.
[28] The second line of inquiry directed in Grant – the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interest of the accused – points strongly toward exclusion of the evidence. As the trial judge observed, this was a “very serious breach” of the appellant’s constitutional rights. The appellant had a high expectation of privacy in his own residence. That privacy was compromised by an intrusive and extensive police search. The powerfully-negative impact on the core of the appellant’s legitimate privacy interests creates the risk that the admission of the fruits of the search could bring the administration of justice into disrepute: R. v. Grant, at paras. 76-78.
[29] The seriousness of the impact of the breach on the appellant is not mitigated by the fact that the police may have had reasonable and probable grounds when they obtained the warrant, but were unable to demonstrate those grounds at trial because of the confidential-informant privilege. The Crown chose to proceed on the redacted information. The assessments of whether there was a breach and of the impact of that breach on the appellant must be measured against the substance of that redacted information. Assessed from that perspective, this was an extensive, unjustified search of the appellant’s home.
[30] The third arm of the inquiry mandated by Grant looks to society’s interest in an adjudication of a criminal trial on its merits. As indicated in Grant at para. 82:
The fact that the evidence obtained in breach of the Charter may facilitate the discovery of the truth and the adjudication of a case on its merits must therefore be weighed against factors pointing to exclusion, in order to “balance the interests of truth with the integrity of the justice system”.... [Citation omitted.]
[31] Society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits is seriously undercut where highly reliable and important evidence is excluded. The evidence in issue here, particularly the crack cocaine, was entirely reliable and essential to the Crown’s case. The charge is also a serious one, although as the majority point out in Grant, at para. 84, the seriousness of the charge will “cut both ways” when assessing society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits.
TORONTO_ More than 20,000 people have joined an anti-prorogation group on Facebook following Prime Minister Stephen Harper's decision to suspend Parliament for two months.
Published reports say the site was created by Christopher White, a University of Alberta student upset by Harper's decision to suspend Parliament until after the Vancouver Winter Olympics.
The site is called Canadians Against Proroguing Parliament. It is urging people to contact their MPs to get back to work.
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
Last fall, the American Law Institute, which created the intellectual framework for the modern capital justice system almost 50 years ago, pronounced its project a failure and walked away from it.
The Court found that aggravating or mitigating factors on sentencing can be found by a sentencing court based on victim impact statements. Presumably such evidence, not being subject to cross-examination, has to be treated with caution.
The decision was released mid December but only came to my attention today.
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/mobile/opinion/editorial/Cynical+leadership/2394180/story.html
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777

After Detroit Near-Attack, Is Afghan Strategy The Right One?
The failed bombing of a Detroit-bound airplane by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab has raised a ton of questions - from what holes there are in airline security, to how he wasn't picked up before on suspicion of terrorist activity. But, to me and the forces in or heading to Afghanistan, one of the most pressing questions is why we're sending nearly every Marine and Soldier we have to Afghanistan, when Abdulmutallab and a Somali man arrested for plotting a similar attack last month apparently had no real connection to al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Indeed, as now has been widely reported, Abdulmutallab received materials and training in Yemen, a largely lawless, poor country just south of Saudi Arabia. The Somali man, picked up in Mogadishu, seems to have been wearing a similar device as Abdulmutallab, suggesting he received his materials and training from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as well.
Yes, the United States has done some right things to address the threat from this region - sending over $40 million in aid to Yemen last year to fight the squalid conditions in which many Yemenis live, and contributes to an atmosphere that breeds terror, and nearly $70 million in counter-terror funds, to help the government directly combat al-Qaeda. Those funds are expected to increase this year, as well they should.
Clearly, however, money is not enough. It's not enough to fight al-Qaeda in Yemen, or anywhere else throughout Africa, or any region in the future where al-Qaeda takes foot. The United States and its allies have the right to work in conjunction with governments to strike al-Qaeda camps and leaders, or do it ourselves if the in-country government is unable to.
That leads me back to Afghanistan/Pakistan. Yes, the region is still a major center of al-Qaeda activity, and yes, our military must be involved in the region to strike at the terror network. But, given the ability of al-Qaeda to spread and pop up in areas around the globe where we are not present, it simply doesn't make sense anymore to engage in a long-term counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan, which focuses on beating back insurgents rather than al Qaeda, and securing the country at large. That strategy relies on nearly every troop we have, and could have many of them stuck there far past President Obama's 2011 deadline, given Richard Engel's recent report on NBC that Afghan security forces are nowhere near ready, and may never be.
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
"Therefore thus saith the LORD; Ye have not hearkened unto me, in proclaiming liberty, every one to his brother, and every man to his neighbour: behold, I proclaim a liberty for you, saith the LORD, to the sword, to the pestilence, and to the famine; and I will make you to be removed into all the kingdoms of the earth. "
"The system is corrupt. Not the corruption of bribing a judge, but rather the deeper corruption of a system which seeks convictions rather than the truth. It is the corruption of a system that puts innocent people in jail."
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
OPP head Fantino could face charge of threatening public officials
Kenyon Wallace and Matthew Coutts, National Post
Julian Fantino, the Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police, must face an accusation that he illegally tried to influence public officials by threatening them, a Criminal Code offence, a court has ruled.
A judge has ordered a justice of the peace to issue a charge against Ontario Provincial Police Commissioner Julian Fantino, after the former Toronto police chief sent an allegedly threatening email to Caledonia politicians
Under Ontario Superior Court Judge David Crane's Dec. 31 order, Commissioner Fantino will face one count of attempting to influence a municipal official in relation to an April 7, 2007 email to Haldimand County's mayor and councillors. In the email, Commissioner Fantino warned the politicians not to support anti-occupation protests. The Comissioner wrote that he would hold the county accountable for any injuries suffered by OPP officers during protests by a group known as "Caledonia Wake Up Call."
...
In August of this year Justice of the Peace David Brown refused to issue a summons to Commissioner Fantino for allegedly violating Section 123 (2) of the Criminal Code of Canada, which states it is an offence to influence or attempt to influence a municipal official in municipal activities by means of threats. In his ruling Justice of the Peace Brown stated "there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that this email was perceived as threatening by the Mayor and by Councillor Grice." He ruled he could not determine whether the threats influenced the politicians acting in their official roles and therefore refused to issue the summons.
However, Ontario Superior Court Judge Crane said in his ruling Thursday that determining whether or not evidence existed that the Mayor and County council were influenced by Commissioner Fantino's letter was not an essential element in deciding whether to issue a summons. He therefore ordered the justice of the peace to sign the charge brought forward by Mr. McHale in a process known as mandamus, a rare order compelling a lower court to perform its duties properly.
James Morton
1100-5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4
416 225 2777
www.jmortonmusings.blogspot.com