Monday, January 26, 2009

Restrictive covenants and employment law

Friday's Supreme Court decision in   Shafron v. KRG Insurance Brokers (Western) Inc., 2009 SCC 6 deals with an important issue in employment law -- restrictive covenants. This note summarises the legal reasoning and provides a brief passage from the case.

Restrictive covenants generally are restraints of trade and contrary to public policy.  Freedom to contract, however, requires an exception for reasonable restrictive covenants.  Normally, the reasonableness of a covenant will be determined by its geographic and temporal scope as well as the extent of the activity sought to be prohibited.   Reasonableness cannot be determined if a covenant is ambiguous in the sense that what is prohibited is not clear as to activity, time, or geography.  An ambiguous restrictive covenant is by definition, prima facie unreasonable and unenforceable.  The onus is on the party seeking to enforce the restrictive covenant to show that it is reasonable and a party seeking to enforce an ambiguous covenant will be unable to demonstrate reasonableness.

Restrictive covenants in employment contracts are scrutinised more rigorously than restrictive covenants in a sale of a business because there is often an imbalance in power between employees and employers and because a sale of a business often involves a payment for goodwill whereas no similar payment is made to an employee leaving his or her employment.  Where the restrictive covenant arises in an employment contract it attracts the higher standard of scrutiny. 

Notional severance, reading down a contractual provision so as to make it legal and enforceable, is not an appropriate mechanism to cure a defective restrictive covenant.  Notional severance may be available where an objective bright line test exists to distinguish what is legal from what is not.  There is no objective bright‑line test for reasonableness and applying notional severance simply amounts to a court rewriting a covenant in a manner that it subjectively considers reasonable.  Employers should not be invited to draft overly broad restrictive covenants with the prospect that the court will sever the unreasonable parts or read down the covenant to what the courts consider reasonable.  This would change the risks assumed by the parties and inappropriately increase the risk that an employee will be forced to abide by an unreasonable covenant. 

Blue‑pencil severance, removing part of a contractual provision, may be resorted to sparingly and only in cases where the part being removed is clearly severable, trivial and not part of the main purport of the restrictive covenant. 

Rectification cannot be invoked to resolve ambiguity in the absence of clarity in the parties minds as to what was agreed. Rectification is used to restore what the parties' agreement actually was, were it not for the error in the written agreement.  Where there is no indication that the parties agreed on something and then mistakenly included something else in the written contract rectification does not apply. 

Part of the Court's reasons read:

[15]                          A restrictive covenant in a contract is what the common law refers to as a restraint of trade.  Restrictive covenants are frequently found in agreements for the purchase and sale of a business and in employment contracts.  A restrictive covenant precludes the vendor in the sale of a business from competing with the purchaser and, in an employment contract, the restrictive covenant precludes the employee, upon leaving employment, from competing with the former employer.   

[16]                          Restrictive covenants give rise to a tension in the common law between the concept of freedom to contract and public policy considerations against restraint of trade.  In the seminal decision of the House of Lords in Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535, this tension was explained.  At common law, restraints of trade are contrary to public policy because they interfere with individual liberty of action and because the exercise of trade should be encouraged and should be free.  Lord Macnaghten stated, at p. 565:   The public have an interest in every person's carrying on his trade freely: so has the individual.  All interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public policy, and therefore void.  That is the general rule.  

[17]                          However, recognition of the freedom of the parties to contract requires that there be exceptions to the general rule against restraints of trade.  The exception is where the restraint of trade is found to be reasonable.  At p. 565, Lord Macnaghten continued:  

But there are exceptions: restraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action may be justified by the special circumstances of a particular case.  It is a sufficient justification, and indeed it is the only justification, if the restriction is reasonable – reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way injurious to the public.  That, I think, is the fair result of all the authorities. [Emphasis added.]  

Therefore, despite the presumption that restrictive covenants are prima facie unenforceable, a reasonable restrictive covenant will be upheld.
James Morton
1100 - 5255 Yonge Street
Toronto, Ontario
M2N 6P4

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