Wilful blindness is not a mitigating factor in sentencing

Today's Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Sidhu, 2009 ONCA 81 makes the important point that wilful blindness is not a mitigating circumstance in the sentencing of criminals.

Indeed, once there is a conclusion that a convict has been wilfully blind, the degree of moral blameworthiness is the same as if there was full knowledge. Although arising in a drug mule case there is no reason not to apply the reasoning to any circumstance of wilful blindness.

The Court holds:

[16] In that regard, some clarification is needed to address the significance, if any, of couriers, like the respondent, who purposefully shut their eyes to the nature and quantity of the illicit substance they are importing.

[17] The trial judge considered the respondent's wilful blindness to be a mitigating circumstance. With respect, we disagree. As a matter of principle and policy, we ought not to be sending a message to would-be-couriers that if they wear blinders, they will receive a lower sentence than if they actually learn the nature and quantity of the substance they are importing. In assessing degrees of moral blameworthiness, we see no meaningful distinction between the two.

[18] In so concluding, we are not to be taken as departing from the principle enunciated by this court in R. v. H. (C.N.) (2002), 170 C.C.C. (3d) 253 - that where an offender takes reasonable steps to determine the nature of the drug and is duped by his co-conspirators, this will serve as a mitigating factor.

[19] That, however, is not this case. The respondent was wilfully blind to the nature and quantity of the substance he was importing. Having kept himself in the dark, he cannot rely on his lack of knowledge as a mitigating factor.