Under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 3 a franchisee has a right of rescission in limited circumstances.
A key question is whether a disclosure document has been delivered – if such document has been delivered then reciscission is limited.
Today’s decision in 4287975 Canada Inc. v. Imvescor Restaurants Inc., 2009 ONCA 308 makes the limitation on rescission very clear:
[25] In respect to timing, s. 5 of the Act ensures that a prospective franchisee has at least fourteen days to review and consider a disclosure document before signing a franchise agreement or paying consideration in relation to a franchise. In the event that the franchisor does not comply with s. 5, the Act provides the franchisee with an extraordinary remedy: the right to rescind the franchise agreement with two different limitation periods, depending on when and whether the franchisor provides a disclosure document.
[26] First, s. 6(1) permits rescission within sixty days of receipt of the disclosure document if the disclosure document is not provided “within the time required by s. 5”. Not only did the appellant not provide a notice of rescission within sixty days of receiving the document, but it also had six months to consider the disclosure document before entering into the agreement.
[27] Second, under s. 6(2), a franchisee may rescind a franchise agreement within two years, but only if there was no disclosure document provided by the franchisor. In particular, for s. 6(2) to apply, the franchisor must never have provided the disclosure document. The time for rescission under s. 6(2) starts to run from the date when the franchise agreement was signed, owing to the fact that unlike under s. 6(1) — where the applicable time starts when a proper disclosure document is provided — s. 6(2) applies to a situation where there is no disclosure document provided at all.
[28] In sum, s. 6(1) provides for a sixty day rescission period if either a franchisor fails to deliver a disclosure document within the required time periods under s. 5 or the contents of a disclosure document did not meet the requirements of s. 5. Section 6(2) provides for a two year rescission period in the event of a failure by the franchisor to deliver a disclosure document.
[29] To state it in the terms of the appellant’s arguments, s. 6(1) applies to a situation in which the franchisee was unable to make a fully informed decision as a result of inadequate time for consideration of such decision or inadequate disclosure of the material facts. Section 6(2) applies to a situation in which the franchisee is unable to make an informed decision at all because of a complete lack of a disclosure document.
[30] As noted, there was disclosure in this case. As the motion judge correctly held, s. 6(2) of the Act, therefore, has no application.
[31] The motion judge also found that s. 6(1) was not available to the appellant on the facts of this case, noting at para. 12 that s. 6(1) “does not purport to provide a rescission right in all circumstances”. Again, I agree with the motion judge.
[32] Section 6(1) contemplates a situation in which a franchisor has failed to comply with the timing or content requirements of the Act in respect of a disclosure document. It extends the time normally provided for the review of the disclosure document (at least fourteen days) to afford a franchisee sixty days from the date the disclosure document is given to review the disclosure document and determine whether to rescind a binding franchise agreement.
1 comment:
I think you are mistaken here about the interplay between 6(2) and 5(4).
The original application stipulated for the purposes of a Rule 22 motion.
' As noted, the parties have agreed that I may assume that the Disclosure Document fully complied with the disclosure provisions of section 5(4) of the Act. That is said to be without prejudice to any position which the applicant may subsequently wish to adopt. The agreement as to the facts are therefore only as to the special case and the applicant may resile from that agreement in the future.'
So, Ian Roher, effectively precluded his client from using the traditional method of employing 6(2) to get around the short limitiation period in 6(1), that is to argue that the disclosure was so incomplete as to be no disclosure at all.
This CA decision has no bearing on that tactic, and is confined to very odd situations of complete and full disclosure for a longer period of time than required by the Act. Who would have thought that rescission would be available in such a situation?
Post a Comment