The Court holds:
18] The appellants contend that ss. 467.1 and 467.12 are both vague and overbroad. They single out "the facilitation" in s. 467.1 and "in association with" in s. 467.12 as phrases that trigger vagueness and overbreadth concerns. They submit that the effect of these words is that s. 467.12 of the Code creates "a fundamentally standardless offence."
[19] For several reasons, I do not accept this submission.
[20] First, it is important not to exaggerate the role of the vagueness and overbreadth principles in Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. They exist, they are regularly invoked by litigants unhappy with certain laws, but the reality is that they are rarely applied by the courts to invalidate federal or provincial laws. The reason for this is the careful and narrow way these principles have been defined in the case law.
[21] Thus, overbreadth exists only if the adverse effect of legislation on individuals subject to it is grossly disproportionate to the state interest the legislation seeks to protect or achieve: see R. v. Malmo-Levine (2003), 179 C.C.C. (3d) 417 (S.C.C.) at para. 143. This test, as Sharpe J.A. noted recently, "clearly incorporates a substantial measure of deference to the legislature's assessment of the risk to public safety and the need for the impugned law": Cochrane v. Ontario (2008), 92 O.R. (3d) 321 ( C.A. ) at para. 31.
[22] Similarly, a law should be declared impermissibly vague only if it does not provide a "basis for legal debate and coherent judicial interpretation.…[i]f judicial interpretation is possible, then an impugned law is not vague": R. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1995), 99 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) at para. 79. It follows that there is "a relatively high threshold" for potential application of the vagueness principle to an impugned law: Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute) (1999), 135 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) at para. 68
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