Executive and judiciary distinct and roles ought not to be blurred

In general actions of a prosecutor, even if backing out from a joint sentence agreement, will not be reviewed by the Courts. This is because there is a distinction between the role of the judiciary and the executive.

Quaere, does such distinction apply broadly to executive decisions such as domestic policy and foreign affairs?

See R. v. Nixon, 2009 ABCA 269:

[19] The high threshold for the review of matters of prosecutorial discretion has its genesis in the
constitutional imperative requiring a bright line between the roles of the judiciary and the executive;
the functions of judges and prosecutors must not be blurred. If the court steps in to review the
prosecutor's exercise of discretion, the court effectively becomes a supervising prosecutor and ceases to be an independent tribunal. Examining the basis for a prosecution suggests invasive
scrutiny of prosecutors' motives, decisions and confidential strategies. Such examination would undermine law enforcement and prosecutorial effectiveness. Moreover, decisions to initiate,
terminate or accept a plea to a lesser charge are not easily reviewed and are particularly ill-suited to judicial review, given the breadth and nature of the considerations that must be taken into account in making such decisions. See: R. v. Power, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601 at 623-629, 89 C.C.C. (3d) 1 ("Power"); R. v. Ng, 2003 ABCA 1, 327 A.R. 215 ("Ng") at paras. 24 and 30; and Krieger at paras. 31-32.

James Morton
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