Proportionality in sentencing

R. v. Tabbara, 2009 CanLII 57453 gives a good statement of proportionality in sentencing. The case arises in manslaughter but applies generally:

Principle of Proportionality

[50] The proportionality principle outlined under s. 718.1 requires that full consideration be given to both the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. In sentencing an individual for manslaughter, the sentence must be tailored to the degree of moral culpability of the offender.

[51] The enormity of the tragic consequences of an offence should not be allowed to unduly distort the consideration of the court as to the appropriate remedy: see R. v. Mellstrom (1975), 222 C.C.C. (2d) 472. In addition, it is an error for the court on sentencing to give undue weight to the actual, rather than the probable results of the act, where it is clear that, at the time of the act, in this case the assault, the probability of the actual results could not have been on the accused's mind: see R. v. Griffin (1975), 23 C.C.C. (2d) 11.

[52] On the other hand, where the offender knew or was willfully blind to the fact that his unlawful act was likely to put the victim at risk of death or cause death, there will be a heightened degree of moral blameworthiness: see R. v. K.K.L., [1995] A.J. No. 434 at ¶14.

[53] While giving weight to all the principles of sentencing, the sentencing judge must assess the extent of moral culpability in a particular case and consider where on the continuum from almost accident to almost murder, the particular offence falls: see R. v. Henry, [2002] N.S.J. No. 113 (C.A.) at ¶19.