Presumption of prejudice through delay in a civil context

Tanguay v. Brouse, 2010 ONCA 73, released today, restates a presumption that delay, even in a civil context, leads to prejudice:

 

[2]              As the motion judge observed, in the face of inordinate delay, a rebuttable presumption arises that the defendants are prejudiced because a substantial risk arises “that a fair trial might not be possible":  See Armstrong v. McCall (2006), 213 OAC 229 quoting Woodheath Developments Ltd. v. Goldman (2003), 66 O.R. (3d) 731 at 732 (Ont. Div. Ct.).  There are several bases for the presumption. One recognizes that memories fade over time and another recognizes that justice delayed is justice denied.  Expeditious justice is the objective.  The presumption strengthens with the length of the delay.  Given the length of the delay in the present case, the presumption of prejudice is strong. See Clairmonte v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1970), 12 D.L.R. (3d) 425.