Restitution Orders

Today’s decision in R. v. Popert, 2010 ONCA 89 raises an interesting albeit technical issue with regard to a restitution order made at the end of a criminal trial.

Such orders are designed to give some compensation to the victims of crime.

In the immediate case, homeowners arranged to have their home burned so as to make an insurance claim. The fire occurred and insurance money was paid out to the homeowners.

A restitution order was made (the order was set aside by the Court of Appeal on other grounds). The accused against whom the restitution order was made argued that restitution should be available to an insurer that paid out monies on a claim on the basis of subrogation only. And since the people who were paid – the homeowners – had no right to payment (the homeowners having arranged the fire) the accused argued no restitution was payable as there was no right to subrogate.

The Court of Appeal made short work of that argument finding that the insurer was entitled to restitution as a direct victim of crime. The Court writes:

… on a plain reading of s. 738(1)(a), its scope is not restricted to persons whose property has been directly damaged, lost or destroyed as a result of an offence. Section 738(1) empowers the court to order restitution to “another person” in the case of damage, loss or destruction of the property of “any person”.