When should specific Code provisions regarding self-defence be put to the jury?

The self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code are notoriously complex. Whether or not a specific Code section should be put to a jury is a difficult question indeed. The Court of Appeal, in R. v. Scotney, 2011 ONCA 251, just released online, did what it could to clarify when a provision should be put to the jury saying:

[18] In Pintar, this court set out a functional structure for trial courts to use to determine which of the self-defence provisions should be left with the jury in any particular case in order to avoid the confusion that consistently arose when all the sections were left, while at the same time giving the accused the maximum benefit of the available provisions. In articulating this approach, Moldaver J.A. carefully explained the latter point at p. 496:

Let me be clear about the underlying purpose of the functional approach in the context of self-defence. The functional approach is not designed to remove legitimate cases of self-defence from the jury's consideration; nor is it meant to impinge upon the principle that an accused is entitled, as a matter of law, to have all defences put to the jury that are realistically available on the evidence. Rather, its purpose is to relieve against some of the confusion and complexity that has plagued self-defence instruction by enabling trial judges to be somewhat more selective and proactive in the formulation of their instruction. It is designed to encourage trial judges to pinpoint the real basis upon which the claim to self-defence rests and communicate that defence to the jury in as clear and comprehensible a fashion as possible.

[19] I set out again the four part test from Pintar:

(1) Consider the evidence carefully with a view to determining the essence of the claim to self-defence and the Code provision(s) realistically available to that claim.

(2) To the extent that the evidence fails the air of reality test in respect of one or more of the constituent elements of a particular provision, that provision should not be left with the jury.

(3) To the extent that the evidence clearly establishes one or more of the constituent elements of a particular provision, Crown counsel should be encouraged to admit the underlying facts and thereby avoid unnecessary legal instruction.

(4) Where a particular provision affords the accused a wider scope of justification than a companion provision, the narrower provision should only be put to the jury if the evidence lends an air of reality to the factual underpinnings of that provision, and the provision somehow fills a gap unaccounted for in the justification afforded by the wider provision.