Sentence appeals

R. v. Preddy, 2011 BCCA 324 is a helpful source for the law regarding the limited scope of sentence appeals:

 

[17]           Sentence appeals are limited in scope.  The approach to be taken by an appellate court on such an appeal was stated by Mr. Justice LeBel in R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 (CanLII), 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, in the following terms:

[46]      Appellate courts grant sentencing judges considerable deference when reviewing the fitness of a sentence.  In M. (C.A.), Lamer C.J. cautioned that a sentence could only be interfered with if it was “demonstrably unfit” or if it reflected an error in principle, the failure to consider a relevant factor, or the over-emphasis of a relevant factor (para. 90; see also R. v. L.M.,2008 SCC 31 (CanLII), 2008 SCC 31, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163, at paras. 14-15; R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 (CanLII), 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at paras. 123-26; R. v. McDonnell, 1997 CanLII 389 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948, at paras. 14-17; R. v. Shropshire, 1995 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227).  As Laskin J.A. explained in R. v. McKnight1999 CanLII 3717 (ON CA), (1999), 135 C.C.C. (3d) 41 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 35, however, this does not mean that appellate courts can interfere with a sentence simply because they would have weighed the relevant factors differently:

To suggest that a trial judge commits an error in principle because in an appellate court’s opinion the trial judge gave too much weight to one relevant factor or not enough weight to another is to abandon deference altogether.  The weighing of relevant factors, the balancing process is what the exercise of discretion is all about.  To maintain deference to the trial judge’s exercise of discretion, the weighing or balancing of relevant factors must be assessed against the reasonableness standard of review.  Only if by emphasizing one factor or by not giving enough weight to another, the trial judge exercises his or her discretion unreasonably should an appellate court interfere with the sentence on the ground the trial judge erred in principle.