Adequacy of reasons in youth matters

R. v. A.J.S., 2011 ONCA 566 deals with the adequacy of reasons in a youth matter.  Although very fact based it is a useful source for the principle that reasons must be as fully fleshed out for youths as for adults:

 

[12]         The adequacy of reasons as a basis for appellate interference with the verdict of a trial judge has been the subject of a number of recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, including: R. v. Sheppard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869; R. v. Braich, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 903; R. v. Gagnon, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621; R. v. R.E.M., [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3; and R. v. Dinardo, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788.

 

[13]         The reasons must respond to the live issues in the case, and will only be viewed as insufficient where they “foreclose meaningful appellate review”: see Dinardo at para. 25, citing Sheppard at para. 25.) In Gagnon, the court stated at para. 21 that where the charge is serious, and the evidence of a child and an adult accused are in conflict, the accused is entitled to be able to understand from the reasons why his or her evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt. In Dinardo, the court specifically reiterated the latter proposition (para. 35).

 

[14]         In this case, the complainant was a very young child — only five years old. Although the appellant is not an adult, he is entitled to the same rights regarding the process used to convict him and the explanation of that conviction. The complainant gave two video statements to police that were made exhibits pursuant to s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code. The second statement was as a result of the complainant remembering more things and telling his mother that he wanted to tell the officer about them. At the trial, he testified outside the courtroom pursuant to s. 486.2(1) of the Criminal Code, intermittently over a multi-day period.

 

[15]         Although the trial judge first stated that he found the complainant’s testimony “compelling”, he then went on to discuss the fact that it was the parents’ corroborative evidence that “restored the Court’s confidence in accepting the complainant’s evidence”, suggesting that the trial judge may have had concerns about the complainant’s evidence without the corroborating value of the parents’ evidence. It may be that the trial judge was referring only to corroborating the times that the complainant was left alone with the appellant, but the trial judge does not make that clear.

 

[16]         In light of the age of the complainant, the problems with his testimony alluded to by the trial judge, and his reliance upon corroboration from the parents who had no first-hand knowledge of the allegations, it was incumbent on the trial judge to explain more fully how he reconciled these problems in the face of the appellant’s denial, which was not a denial of the times that the two were together, but merely that any sexual contact had occurred.

 

[17]         In rejecting the appellant’s denial as one “of convenience”, the trial judge did not acknowledge that it is very difficult for anyone to prove a negative. To the contrary, he seemed to require the appellant to interpret “what may have happened”, i.e., to effectively speculate about why the complainant said what he did.  Nor does the trial judge explain how someone who denies that anything happened could give an “interpretation of what may have happened.” The trial judge also discounted the evidence given by the appellant and other defence witnesses about the complainant hitting him and others in the testicles or “crotch-grabbing”, referring to this as a somewhat corollary or collateral issue that did not inspire any doubt but only formed part of the history of events.

 

[18]         This case involved very serious charges. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant was entitled to understand why his evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt. The three reasons the trial judge gives for rejecting the appellant’s evidence are generic and conclusory, and provide no insight into his reasoning or the basis for reaching the conclusion he did.