A litigant should not be deprived of counsel of its choice without good cause

Kaiser (Re), 2011 ONCA 713, released today, has a good summary statement of the general rule a litigant should not be deprived of counsel of its choice without good cause:

 

[21]         As the motion judge properly noted, “A litigant should not be deprived of counsel of its choice without good cause.  See McDonald Estate v. Martin, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1235.”  For this reason, Canadian courts exercise the highest level of restraint before interfering with a party’s choice of counsel.  Where such discretionary, equitable relief is invoked, there must be a possibility of real mischief should a removal order be refused.  The test is whether a fair-minded and reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that counsel’s removal is necessary for the proper administration of justice: see for example, McDonald; Zawadzki v. Matthews Group Ltd. (1998), 18 C.P.C. (4th) 373 (Ont. Gen. Div.);Colville-Reeves v. Canadian Home Publishers Inc. (2002), 111 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1202 (S.C.); Lautec Properties Inc. v. Barzel Windsor (1984) Inc. (2002), 26 C.P.C. (5th) 131 (S.C.).