R. v. McDonald, 2012 ONCA 379 points out that consent can be a defence to assault bodily harm. Specifically, consent is a defence and is vitiated only when the accused intended to cause serious bodily harm and the accused caused serious bodily harm:
 In R. v. Paice, there was a scuffle in a bar and the accused was challenged by the deceased to go outside and fight, which he did. They exchanged threats and the deceased pushed the accused once or twice. The accused hit the deceased in the jaw, and the deceased fell backward and hit his head twice. The accused then straddled the deceased and struck him twice more. The deceased died as a result of his injuries. The accused was charged with manslaughter. He argued that the deceased’s consent to the fight vitiated criminal responsibility and that the trial judge used an incorrect test for determining whether consent is negated. The trial judge held that the defence of consent did not apply if there was either intent to cause serious bodily harm or serious bodily harm was caused.
 The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal. The court held that the trial judge erred in formulating the test in the alternative. Rather, the court held at para. 18 that, in accordance with the Jobidon decision, consent cannot be nullified unless there is both intent to cause serious bodily harm and serious bodily harm is caused. The Supreme Court re-affirmed and refined the Jobidon decision and held that serious harm must be both intended and caused for consent to be vitiated.
 In R. v. Quashie, the Court of Appeal considered an appeal from conviction of the offences of sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm where the complainant alleged that she had been sexually assaulted and that she was injured during the second assault. The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to charge the jury on the issue of consent in respect of the offence of aggravated or sexual assault causing bodily harm and submitted that there was no suggestion that the accused deliberately inflicted injury or pain to the complainant. It was argued that whatever injuries the complainant suffered were incidental to sexual intercourse and that consent was an available defence. Justice Gillese reviewed the decision in R. v. Paice and wrote at para. 57:
Based on the authorities, in my view, it was an error for the trial judge to fail to instruct the jury that in order for bodily harm to vitiate consent, they had to find both that the appellant had intended to inflict bodily harm on the complainant and that the appellant had caused her bodily harm.
 Accordingly, following Paice and Quashie, consent is vitiated only when the accused intended to cause serious bodily harm and the accused caused serious bodily harm. The defence of consent may, if the facts support it, be available in the context of a charge of aggravated assault. In the case at bar, in my view, the trial judge erred by removing the defence of consent from the jury for its consideration on the charge of aggravated assault.