Counsel working on contingency ought not, in general, be required to post security for costs

Indcondo Building Corp v. Sloan, 2012 ONCA 502 has an interesting comment in obiter.

The governing principle regarding counsel acting on contingency and security for costs is that such is improper because to order counsel acting on contingency to post security would chill the very access to justice that is a main objective of the contingency fee regime.
How much more so would this apply to counsel acting pro bono.

The Court holds:

[6]          Armstrong J.A. disposed of the respondents' request without needing to address the requirements of Rule 61.06, because, in his view, to order counsel acting on contingency to post security would chill the very access to justice that is a main objective of the contingency fee regime.  He found that while in future, exceptions to this governing principle may arise, this was not such a case.

[7]          I agree. Moreover, because of the result I have reached on the appeal itself, it is obvious that this appeal could not be said to be frivolous, and in this respect Rule 61.06 could not be complied with.