Firstly, the Impugned Order was not a "step" under the Trial Judgment. The relief granted by Newbould J. was in a separate action with different parties and different causes of action which, as I have said, included reliance on theFraudulent Conveyances Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act.
 Secondly, the Impugned Order was protective and preservative in nature. Cumming J. made this observation in his endorsement. The only relief sought on the motion before Newbould J. related to the preservation of assets pending determination of the respondents' new action. The Impugned Order therefore did not amount to enforcement of the Trial Judgment. I agree with the respondents' submission that the effect of the stay of the Trial Judgment was to suspend their enforcement rights. However, their rights as judgment creditors remained intact pending appeal.
 Furthermore, the appointment of a receiver and the granting of a Marevainjunction are not necessarily orders for enforcement in any event. Indeed, in this case, the receiver was appointed pursuant to s.101 of the Courts of Justice Act.