R. v. Quansah,
2015 ONCA 237 :
[75] In Browne
v. Dunn, Lord Herschell, L.C., explained that if a party intended to
impeach a witness called by an opposite party, the party who seeks to impeach
must give the witness an opportunity, while the witness is in the witness box,
to provide any explanation the witness may have for the contradictory evidence: Browne
v. Dunn, pp. 70-71; R. v. Henderson (1999), 134 C.C.C.
(3d) 131 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 141; and R. v. McNeill (2000), 144
C.C.C. (3d) 551 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 44.
[76] The
rule in Browne v. Dunn, as it has come to be known, reflects a
confrontation principle in the context of cross-examination of a witness for a
party opposed in interest on disputed factual issues. In some jurisdictions,
for example in Australia, practitioners describe it as a “puttage” rule because
it requires a cross-examiner to “put” to the opposing witness in
cross-examination the substance of contradictory evidence to be adduced through
the cross-examiner’s own witness or witnesses.
[77] The
rule is rooted in the following considerations of fairness:
i. Fairness
to the witness whose credibility is attacked:
The witness is alerted that the
cross-examiner intends to impeach his or her evidence and given a chance to
explain why the contradictory evidence, or any inferences to be drawn from it,
should not be accepted: R. v. Dexter, 2013 ONCA 744, 313 O.A.C.
226, at para. 17; Browne v. Dunn, at pp. 70-71.
ii. Fairness
to the party whose witness is impeached:
The party calling the witness has
notice of the precise aspects of that witness’s testimony that are being
contested so that the party can decide whether or what confirmatory evidence to
call; and
iii. Fairness
to the trier of fact:
Without the rule, the trier of fact
would be deprived of information that might show the credibility impeachment to
be unfounded and thus compromise the accuracy of the verdict.
[78] In
addition to considerations of fairness, to afford the witness the opportunity
to respond during cross-examination ensures the orderly presentation of
evidence, avoids scheduling problems associated with re-attendance and lessens
the risk that the trier of fact, especially a jury, may assign greater emphasis
to evidence adduced later in trial proceedings than is or may be warranted.
[79] Failure
to cross-examine a witness at all or on a specific issue tends to support an
inference that the opposing party accepts the witness’s evidence in its
entirety or at least on the specific point. Such implied acceptance disentitles
the opposing party to challenge it later or, in a closing speech, to invite the
jury to disbelieve it: R. v. Hart (1932), 23 Cr. App. R. 202
(Ct. Crim. App.), at pp. 206-207; R. v. Fenlon (1980), 71 Cr.
App. R. 307 (C.A.), at pp. 313-314.
[80] As
a rule of fairness, the rule in Browne v. Dunn is not a fixed
rule. The extent of its application lies within the sound discretion of the
trial judge and depends on the circumstances of each case: R. v. Paris (2000),
150 C.C.C. (3d) 162 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2001]
S.C.C.A. No. 124, at paras. 21-22; R. v. Giroux (2006), 207
C.C.C. (3d) 512 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2006] S.C.C.A.
No. 211, at para. 42.
[81] Compliance
with the rule in Browne v. Dunn does not require that every
scrap of evidence on which a party desires to contradict the witness for the
opposite party be put to that witness in cross-examination. The
cross-examination should confront the witness with matters of substance on
which the party seeks to impeach the witness’s credibility and on which the
witness has not had an opportunity of giving an explanation because there has
been no suggestion whatever that the witness’s story is not accepted: Giroux,
at para. 46; McNeill, at para. 45. It is only the nature of the
proposed contradictory evidence and its significant aspects that need to be put
to the witness: Dexter, at para. 18; R. v. Verney (1993),
87 C.C.C. (3d) 363 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 375-376; Paris, at para. 22;
and Browne v. Dunn, at pp. 70-71.
[82] In
some cases, it may be apparent from the tenor of counsel’s cross-examination of
a witness that the cross-examining party does not accept the witness’s version
of events. Where the confrontation is general, known to the witness and the
witness’s view on the contradictory matter is apparent, there is no need for
confrontation and no unfairness to the witness in any failure to do so.
[83] It
is worthy of reminder, however, that the requirement of cross-examination does
not extend to matters beyond the observation and knowledge of the witness or to
subjects upon which the witness cannot give admissible evidence.
[84] The
potential relevance to the credibility of an accused’s testimony of the failure
to cross-examine a witness for the prosecution on subjects of substance on
which the accused later contradicts the witness’ testimony depends on several
factors. The factors include but are not limited to:
i. the
nature of the subjects on which the witness was not cross-examined;
ii. the
overall tenor of the cross-examination; and
iii. the
overall conduct of the defence.
See Paris, at para. 23.
[85] Where
the subjects not touched in cross-examination but later contradicted are of
little significance in the conduct of the case and the resolution of critical
issues of fact, the failure to cross-examine is likely to be of little
significance to an accused’s credibility. On the other hand, where a central
feature of a witness’s testimony is left untouched by cross-examination, or
even implicitly accepted in cross-examination, the absence of cross-examination
is likely to have a more telling effect on an accused’s credibility: Paris,
at para. 23.
[86] The
confrontation principle is not violated where it is clear, in all the
circumstances, that the cross-examiner intends to impeach the witness’s story: Browne
v. Dunn, at p. 71. Counsel, who has cross-examined the witness on the
central features in dispute, need not descend into the muck of minutiae to
demonstrate compliance with the rule: Verney, at p. 376.
…
[88] Two
preliminary and oft-made observations serve as my point of departure for the
discussion that follows.
[89] First,
it is too easily overlooked that the rule in Browne v. Dunn is
not some ossified, inflexible rule of universal and unremitting application
that condemns a cross-examiner who defaults to an evidentiary abyss. The rule
is grounded in fairness, its application confined to matters of substance and
very much dependent on the circumstances of the case being tried: Verney,
at p. 376; R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, 305 C.C.C. (3d) 421, at
para. 49.
[90] Second,
and as a consequence of the fairness origins of the rule, a trial judge is best
suited to take the temperature of a trial proceeding and to assess whether any
unfairness has been visited on a party because of the failure to cross-examine.
Consequently, the trial judge’s decision about whether the rule has been
offended and unfairness has resulted is entitled to considerable deference on
appeal: Giroux, at para. 49.
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