Friday, December 18, 2015


R. v. Riesberry, 2015 SCC 65:

[23]                          We should first be clear about what Mr. Riesberry's fraudulent conduct was before turning to the question of whether it caused a risk of deprivation. Fraudulent conduct for the purposes of a fraud prosecution is not limited to deception, such as deception by misrepresentations of fact. Rather, fraud requires proof of "deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means": s. 380(1). The term "other fraudulent means" encompasses "all other means which can properly be stigmatized as dishonest:" R. v. Olan, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1175, at p. 1180. The House of Lords made the same point in Scott v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1975] A.C. 819, a case approved by the Court in Olan (p. 1181). Fraud, according to Viscount Dilhorne in Scott, may consist of depriving "a person dishonestly of something which is his or of something to which he is or would or might but for the perpetration of the fraud be entitled": p. 839.  And as Lord Diplock said, the fraudulent means "need not involve fraudulent misrepresentation such as is needed to constitute the civil tort of deceit": ibid., at p. 841. 

[24]                          It follows that where the alleged fraudulent act is not in the nature of deceit or falsehood, such as a misrepresentation of fact, the causal link between the dishonest conduct and the deprivation may not depend on showing that the victim relied on or was induced to act by the fraudulent act. This is such a case.

Of the Law Societies of Upper Canada and Nunavut 

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