R. v. Badhwar, 2011 ONCA 266 is a good source for the principle that, generally, after offence conduct can be properly admissible to prove guilt providing that other explanations for the conduct are explored:
[25] Specifically, the trial judge made it clear that flight was but one piece of evidence the jury could consider, along with all of the other evidence, in deciding whether the Crown had proved its case against the appellant. Moreover, in the context of that instruction, the trial judge impressed on the jury the “importance [of] evidence that offers other explanations for this conduct …”. The trial judge then reminded the jury of the appellant’s evidence that he did not think he was a part of the accident but that he stayed for 20 to 25 minutes nonetheless until people in the area began “expressing insults and threats to his group”. It was only then that he decided to leave. The trial judge followed that review with the following sharp warning:
You must not use this evidence about what [the appellant] did or said afterwards in deciding or helping you decide that [he] committed these offences unless you reject any other explanation for it. [Emphasis added.]
[26] Contrary to the appellant’s submission, I think it was proper for the trial judge to leave evidence of flight as circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer guilt. No objection was made to the impugned instruction at trial – for good reason in my view.
0 comments:
Post a Comment