Bilingual Statutory Interpretation

Dean v. Mister Transmission (International) Limited, 2011 ONCA 670, a decision of Karakatsanis J.A., soon for the Supreme Court, analyzes bilingual statutory interpretation. Her discussion is most useful:

Bilingual Statutory Interpretation

[28]         The appellant submits that based upon a proper bilingual statutory interpretation of s. 3(2) of the MVRA, the grammatical construction and words of both the English and French versions have a shared meaning. The qualification in the French version of s. 3(2), that it applies if the customer does not proceed with the repairs, relates only to the cost of the damaged parts that require replacement during reassembly. The appellant submits that the lack of a comma before that qualification in the English version creates ambiguity. As a result, he suggests the cost of diagnostic time and the cost of reassembling the vehicle are deemed to be included in a fee for an estimate, whether or not the consumer authorizes the repairs.

[29]         When interpreting bilingual statutes, the court must determine whether there is an ambiguity. Generally, when there is ambiguity in one version of a provision but not the other, the court should look for the meaning that is common to both versions: R. v. Daoust, 2004 SCC 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 217, at para. 28. If there is a common meaning, the court must then determine whether it is consistent with the legislature's intent, using the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation: see Daoust, at para. 30. Courts are obliged to give effect to the law as the legislature intended to enact it.

[30]         Even if there were some shared meaning in this case, based upon a comparison of both language versions, I do not accept the interpretation proposed by the appellant. As Binnie J. stated in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 339, at para. 39, when interpreting a bilingual statute:

Linguistic analysis of the text is the servant, not the master, in the task of ascertaining Parliamentary intention. A blinkered focus on the textual variations might lead to an interpretation at odds with the modern rule because, standing alone, linguistic consideration ought not to elevate an argument about text above the relevant context, purpose and objectives of the legislative scheme. [Citations omitted.]

[31]         In Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, at para. 25, Gonthier J. held: "the principle of preferring the interpretation that leads to a shared meaning is, in any event, not absolute. The Court can reject that meaning if it seems contrary to the legislature's intention in light of the other principles of interpretation."