Jury verdicts seldom to be overturned as being perverse

Simao v. Hankook Ilbo, 2012 ONCA 175 deals with when a civil jury verdict may be overturned as being perverse.  The Court makes the high threshold for such finding very clear, especially in the context of defamation cases:

[21]     The standard of review for findings of fact made by a jury is well-established. In Jones v. Niklaus, 2008 ONCA 504, at para. 26, my colleague Armstrong J.A. stated:

Before addressing the above issues, it is necessary to consider the standard of review of findings of fact made by a jury. InDeshane v. Deere & Co. (1993), 15 O.R. (3d) 225 at 231 (C.A.), Lacourcière J.A. (dissenting on other grounds) said:

The principles governing appellate review of the verdict of a jury have been laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada inMcLean v. McCannell, [1937] S.C.R. 341 at p. 343, [1937] 2 D.L.R. 639, so that 'the verdict of a jury will not be set aside as against the weight of evidence unless it is so plainly unreasonable and unjust as to satisfy the Court that no jury reviewing the evidence as a whole and acting judicially could have reached it'. The principle has been re-affirmed in Vancouver-Fraser Park District v. Olmstead, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 831 at p. 839, 51 D.L.R. (3d) 416, where de Grandpré J., delivering the judgment of the court, stated:

All of the relevant cases make it abundantly clear that jury verdicts must be treated with considerable respect and must be accorded great weight. This does not mean however that they should be regarded with awe.

It was in that case also that the court, at p. 836, rejected the suggestion that a verdict should be 'perverse', implying moral turpitude, before it could be set aside. Instead, the court adopted a test that examines whether the evidence so preponderates against the verdict as to show that it was unreasonable and unjust. There is a further principle enunciated by Laskin C.J.C. delivering the majority judgment in Cameron v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 138 at p. 142, 119 D.L.R. (3d) 257, and it is that jury's findings are 'entitled to rational appreciation and to be regarded in as favourable a light as the evidence supporting it'.

See also Barker (c.o.b. Mike Barber Auto Sales) v. Zurich Insurance Co. (2001), 140 O.A.C. 358 (C.A.) at para. 26; andPlester v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co. (2006), 269 D.L.R. (4th) 624 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 315.

[22]     The reluctance to interfere with jury verdicts is especially pronounced in defamation actions, particularly on the question of whether or not the words complained of bear defamatory meaning: see Raymond E. Brown, Brown On Defamation, 2d. ed., looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2010), at para. 24.2, quoting Scrutton L.J. in Broome v. Agar (1928), 138 L.T. 698 (C.A.), at p. 700: "'Libel or no libel' is peculiarly a question for the jury; …only in the most extreme cases should the judge allow his view to override that of the constitutional tribunal". See also Wills v. Carman (1889), 17 O.R. 223 (C.A.), at p. 225: "It is for the jury to say whether alleged defamatory matter published is a libel or not, and the widest latitude is given to them in dealing with it."

[23]     In my view, Simao has failed to surmount this high hurdle.

[24]     There can be little doubt that the main target of the article and the man portrayed as being the culprit was Park. Simao is mentioned four times in the article.

[25]     First, the article states that a truck driver filed a complaint to the Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants "about Mr. Park and his legal representative, Yolanda Simao". In my view, it was open to the jury to conclude that the ordinary reader would not attribute Park's moral culpability in the scheme to Simao simply because she was his "legal representative". Simao concedes that the statement that a complaint has been filed is not defamatory.

[26]     Second, the article states that it was Simao "who signed the various contracts" to obtain the required immigration status. Third, the article purports to quote a Highland representative (apparently Bill Kalbhenn, though he is not named in the article) stating that he told the truck drivers "through Simao" that he would hire them once they were qualified. Fourth, a quotation attributed to Park states that "[t]he contracts were made by Simao on behalf of the [trucking] company and the applicants."

[27]     At the end of the day the real question is whether the only reading of the article open to the jury is one that accuses Simao of fraud or forgery. Such a reading was certainly possible: the article states that she "made" and "signed" the contracts and that the representative of the trucking company denied signing the contracts and claimed that his signature must have been "faked".

[28]     However, in my view it was open to the jury to conclude that the ordinary reader would not read the article in that way. The general thrust of the article is that Park took advantage of vulnerable truck drivers and that the trucking company failed to live up to its legal obligations. In this context, the jury was entitled to find that the ordinary reader would read the claim of faked signatures as no more than the trucking company's hollow excuse for reneging on its legal obligations. It was open to the jury to conclude that an ordinary reader would interpret the words of the article as meaning that there were no "faked" or forged signatures, but rather unscrupulous businessmen trying to evade their legal responsibilities at the expense of vulnerable immigrants.

[29]     A lawyer, trained to read documents with forensic precision, might well read the article differently. But that is not the test. The question for the jury was to determine whether reasonable men and women of ordinary understanding – not lawyers – reading the article articles as a whole, would take the words to convey a meaning that discredits the plaintiff.