R v Flight, 2014
ABCA 185:
[46]
The Manitoba Court of Appeal recently considered these divergent
approaches in R v Mitchell, 2013 MBCA 44 (CanLII), 2013 MBCA 44, 291 Man R
(2d) 231.
[47]
In Mitchell, the peace officer observed the following
before he developed his suspicions: the driver was driving at night without
headlights; the odour of alcohol was emanating from the vehicle; and the driver
admitted that he had consumed alcohol. The Court upheld the trial judge’s
finding that these factors were sufficient for the officer to form a reasonable
suspicion that the driver had alcohol in his body.
[48]
Writing for the Court, Monnin JA was not prepared to say that a
simple admission of alcohol consumption will always, in and of itself, be
sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion. However, he made the following
observation:
[35] From a common sense
perspective, however, it would be rare, if ever, that there would be an
admission of alcohol consumption with nothing else – i.e., evidence as to why
the vehicle was stopped, when (especially the time of the day and of the year)
and where it was stopped, what was the driver's condition, how did he or she
react to the police, what were the driver’s exact words and how were they
spoken, etc. These are all important factors to take into account.
[49]
However, he noted that there will rarely be a need for a peace
officer to obtain an alcohol consumption history from a driver before forming a
reasonable suspicion: Mitchell at paras 35, 37. He based this
conclusion on the wording and purpose of section
254(2), which is to provide a brief, but important, investigative tool: Mitchell at
para 37.
[50]
I agree with the conclusions of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Mitchell.
In most cases, the admission of consumption alone, without further information
about the amount and/or timing of consumption, will be sufficient to ground an
objectively reasonable suspicion. Police officers should not be required to
inquire into alcohol consumption history with a driver at the roadside.
[51]
To the extent that Hnetka, and decisions that follow
it, stand for the proposition that an ambiguous admission of alcohol
consumption is insufficient for a reasonable suspicion, I respectfully
disagree: see also R v Chipchar, 2009 ABQB 562 (CanLII), 2009 ABQB 562 at para 17, [2009] AJ No 1058.
[52]
In my view, the wording of section
254(2) suggests that the admission of alcohol alone will, generally,
ground an objectively justifiable, reasonable suspicion. That section provides
that a peace officer can make a roadside ASD demand where he “has reasonable
grounds to suspect that a person has alcohol or a drug in their body and that
person has, within the preceding three hours, operated a motor vehicle”. As
noted by this Court in Gilroy, the test for reasonable suspicion in section
254(2) is based on consumption alone, not its amount or effects.
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